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 Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions have risen 
dramatically since the 1997 negotiation of the Kyoto 
Protocol, and that rise has continued through Canada’s 
2002 ratification of the Protocol. Along with economic 
dislocation, constitutional barriers to regulation have 
sometimes been cited as the reason for caution in 
regulating greenhouse gases. This article critically 
evaluates the constitutional arguments and examines 
the policy considerations surrounding various 
regulatory instruments that might be used to reduce 
greenhouse gases. We conclude that the Canadian 
constitution does not present any significant barriers to 
federal or provincial regulation and that policy 
considerations strongly favour the use of two 
instruments: a federal carbon tax to impose a marginal 
cost on emissions and the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act to review federal projects that may 
increase greenhouse gases. 
Les émissions de gaz à effet de serre du Canada 
ont augmenté dramatiquement depuis les négociations 
du Protocole de Kyoto en 1997. Cette augmentation a 
continué même subséquemment à la ratification du 
Protocole par le Canada en 2002. En plus de la 
dislocation économique, les barrières constitutionnelles 
à la réglementation ont parfois été citées comme 
justification à la prudence dans la réglementation des 
gaz à effet de serre. Cet article évalue de manière 
critique les arguments constitutionnels et examine les 
considérations de politiques entourant les différents 
instruments réglementaires qui pourraient être utilisés 
pour réduire les gaz à effet de serre. Nous concluons 
que la constitution canadienne ne présente pas de 
barrière significative à la réglementation fédérale ou 
provinciale et que les considérations de politiques 
favorisent fortement l’utilisation de deux instruments, 
soit une taxe fédérale sur le carbone pour imposer un 
coût marginal aux émissions et la Loi canadienne sur 
l’évaluation environnementale pour évaluer les projets 
fédéraux qui pourraient augmenter les gaz à effet de 
serre.   
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Introduction 
 In a 2007 speech to the Canadian Bar Association, former Alberta Premier Peter 
Lougheed warned of an impending constitutional crisis over the regulation of 
greenhouse gases. A “major constitutional battle” was brewing between the federal 
government, which faces increasing international and domestic pressure to regulate 
the emissions of greenhouse gases, and the government of Alberta, which jealously 
guards its provincial prerogative to oversee emissions-producing oil and gas 
development.1 “Public pressure”, in Lougheed’s view, was likely to “force the 
passage of strong federal environmental laws,” while the economic forces driving oil 
sands development were likely to lead to resistance from Alberta in the form of 
conflicting legislation.2  
 Is there really a constitutional storm on the horizon? Although there is tension 
between federal and provincial authority over the regulation of Canadian greenhouse 
gases, this tension need not and should not be an obstacle to sensible greenhouse gas 
regulation. 
I. Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Canada 
 Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions have risen sharply since 1990, the baseline 
year from which the commitments under the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change are derived.3 Indeed, Canada’s increase 
in total aggregate greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 to 2007 was the highest 
among G8 nations,4 rising from 596 megatonnes in carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2 
 
1 Peter Lougheed, Address (delivered to the Canadian Bar Association, Calgary, 14 August 2007) 
[unpublished], online: Cable Public Affairs Channel <http://www.cpac.ca/forms/index.asp?dsp= 
template&act=view3&pagetype=vod&lang=e&clipID=96>. According to Lougheed, the constitu-
tional battle would centre on s. 92A(1) (Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in 
R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5). See generally “How to Head Off an Oil-Sands Clash,” Editorial, The 
Globe and Mail (16 August 2007), online: The Globe and Mail <http://www. 
theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/article776624.ece>. 
2 Lougheed, ibid. 
3 11 December 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148, 37 I.L.M. 22 (entered into force 16 February 2005) [Kyoto 
Protocol]. 
4 Allan Dowd, “Canada Led G8 in Greenhouse Gas Emissions Growth” Reuters (23 April 2008), 
online: Planet Ark <http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/48101/story htm>. In the 
United Nation’s most recent data, Canada ranked ninth among Annex I countries with a 21.7 per cent 
increase in greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 to 2006, behind Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Australia, 
Greece, New Zealand, Ireland, and Iceland (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data for the Period 1990–2006 (Geneva: 
United Nations Office at Geneva, 2008) at 9, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/ 
sbi/eng/12.pdf>). 
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equivalents5) to 747 megatonnes in this period.6 It is now impractical for Canada to 
comply with its Kyoto commitment to lower its emissions to 563 megatonnes. There 
have been increases across almost all sectors between 1990 and 2007, including 
emissions from electricity generation, transportation, petroleum production, mining, 
agriculture, waste, and fugitive releases from natural gas production.7 It no longer 
makes sense for Canada to unilaterally and immediately cease the upward momentum 
of emissions and begin an emissions reduction of more than 25 per cent over the next 
three years.8 However, given the direness of the climate change problem, Canadians 
must embark upon an effective greenhouse gas emissions strategy. Fortunately, as this 
article argues, a number of federal and provincial regulatory possibilities are available 
that avoid constitutional confrontation. 
A. Potential Regulatory Instruments 
 While the many possibilities for greenhouse gas regulation have been treated 
extensively elsewhere, a brief review of potential regulatory instruments will help 
frame the discussion in the Canadian context. This part of article outlines the most 
frequently discussed types of schemes: command-and-control regulations; cap-and-
trade programs; intensity-based emissions trading; carbon taxes; and regulation under 
the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act.9 Alternative means of reducing 
greenhouse gases include regulation that mandates information disclosure, 
government subsidies, voluntary initiatives, and common law litigation. A 
comprehensive treatment of all such methods, which would involve scores of ideas, is 
beyond the scope of this article.  
 First, greenhouse gas regulation could take a traditional form of environmental 
regulation sometimes referred to as “command-and-control” regulation. This term 
typically contemplates some administrative standard that serves as a baseline for 
pollution control performance. The standard could be fixed as a specified numerical 
 
5 “Carbon dioxide equivalents” is a common metric used to directly compare emissions from all six 
greenhouse gases regulated under the Kyoto Protocol: CO2, methane, nitrous oxide, 
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulphur hexafluoride. The metric is used to create a 
relative index that is weighted by the heat-trapping effect of emissions of the different greenhouse 
gases, in comparison with the effect of a tonne of CO2. For example, since methane has twenty-one 
times the heat-trapping power of CO2, emissions of methane are multiplied by twenty-one in 
calculating the index (UNFCCC, ibid. at 3, n. 3). See also U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
Emission Facts: Metrics for Expressing Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Carbon Equivalents and Carbon 
Dioxide Equivalents (February 2005), online: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency <http://www. 
epa.gov/oms/climate/420f05002 htm>.  
6 Environment Canada, Canada’s 2007 Greenhouse Gas Inventory: A Summary of Trends,  
online: Environment Canada <http://www.ec.gc.ca/pdb/ghg/inventory_report/2007/som-sum_eng. 
cfm> [Environment Canada, Greenhouse Gas Inventory].  
7 Ibid. 
8 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, art. 3, s. 1. 
9 S.C. 1992, c. 37 [CEA Act]. 
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expression of performance, such as in the regulations governing chlor-alkali plants 
under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999.10 These regulations provide 
that “[t]he quantity of mercury that the owner or operator of a plant may release into 
the ambient air from that plant shall not exceed (a) 5 grams per day per 1,000 
kilograms of rated capacity, where the source of the mercury is the ventilation gases 
exhausted from cell rooms.”11 Alternatively, a standard could be linked to industry 
practices and could contain keywords that hint at how ambitious the polluter must be 
relative to the industry practice, such as the “Best Available Technology 
Economically Achievable” (BATEA) standard.12 While command-and-control 
regulatory schemes take on a wide variety of forms, the distinguishing feature of 
command-and-control systems is that compliance is determined administratively. This 
determination often (but not always) focuses on whether an emitter has adopted the 
right technology or industrial practices, or has achieved a level of performance 
administratively deemed to be acceptable or attainable.  
 Second, in a marked break in philosophy from the traditional means of 
environmental regulation, “cap-and-trade” programs have gained popularity as a 
regulatory instrument. Rather than defining compliance in terms of some 
administratively set standard, cap-and-trade programs involve the issuance of 
allowances to emitters that permit them to emit a certain quantity of pollution. 
Compliance is thus determined solely by whether the emitter has enough allowances 
to cover its emissions. Allowances can be traded, and economic theory predicts that 
the allowances will flow to their highest and best use—to those emitters for whom 
emissions reduction would be the most costly. This flow has the effect of 
concentrating emissions reductions among those for whom it would be cheapest, 
thereby minimizing overall industry compliance costs. Additionally, cap-and-trade 
programs are thought to spur innovation because imposing a cost on emissions should 
induce emitters to undertake self-interested efforts to reduce their emissions. Cap-
 
10 S.C. 1999, c. 33 [CEP Act]. 
11 Chlor-Alkali Mercury Release Regulations, S.O.R./90-130, s. 3(1)(a). 
12 This was the language in a 2005 plan by the then-governing Liberal Party mandating that new 
industrial facilities large enough to be considered “large final emitters” would, for the first ten years, 
have emissions targets based on the emissions rate obtainable by the industry (Notice of intent to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions by Large Final Emitters, C. Gaz. 2005.I.2489 (Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act) at 2494-95). What exactly was meant by this terminology is unclear, 
though similar language in U.S. statutes suggests that the technology required would lie somewhere 
between those technologies and techniques that are commonly available and those that are cutting-
edge. The U.S. Clean Air Act provides that when a new stationary source of air pollution (defined in 
the statute as certain “criteria air pollutants”: 42 U.S.C. § 7408(g) (1970)) is constructed or 
significantly modified, the facility must achieve the “lowest achievable emission rate” if it is located 
in a heavily polluted zone (ibid., § 7503(a)(2)), and must install the “best available control 
technology” if it is located in a less polluted zone (ibid., § 7475(a)(4)). The terms “heavily polluted 
zones” and “less polluted zones” are our own. They reflect the more technical distinctions drawn by 
the act, which refers to “attainment areas” and “non-attainment areas”. See Shi-Ling Hsu, “The Real 
Problem with New Source Review” (2006) 36 E.L.R. 10095. 
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and-trade programs in the greenhouse gas context typically involve the issuance of 
allowances to emit some quantity of carbon or CO2. 
 Third, in the wake of concerns about the compliance costs of cap-and-trade 
programs, a less effective alternative has emerged, one favoured by the last two 
Canadian federal governments: “intensity-based emissions trading”. Intensity-based 
emissions trading involves not hard and fixed caps, but moving caps that seek only to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions relative to the amount of goods produced, or the 
greenhouse gas intensity, and not necessarily the absolute amount of emissions. 
Under the intensity-based emissions trading programs proposed by Canadian 
governments, allowances are issued to emitters on the basis of their productive 
output. Thus, any emitter that becomes more efficient in operations will be given 
more allowances. Because the cap is dependent upon productive output and can be 
ratcheted up by the achievement of productive efficiencies, there is no hard and fixed 
emissions “cap” per se, and no control over the absolute amount of emissions. 
 Fourth, similar in economic philosophy to cap-and-trade programs, Pigouvian 
taxes have long been popular among economists to address large-scale pollution 
problems,13 suggesting that a “carbon tax” may be appropriate. A carbon tax is a 
payment based on the actual or anticipated quantity of carbon emissions released into 
the atmosphere. In practice, the tax is levied at some point of sale involving a carbon-
based product that is intended for combustion.14 The rationales behind Pigouvian 
taxation and cap-and-trade programs are the same: impose a marginal cost on 
emissions, and the emitters that can most cheaply reduce emissions will do so. The 
difference between taxation and cap-and-trade programs is that a cap-and-trade 
program is essentially a quantity instrument, while a taxation program is a price 
instrument; taxation programs offer a degree of certainty for emitters that the price of 
emissions will stay at a particular level, while cap-and-trade programs attempt to set a 
particular maximum level of emissions, but only among those emitters covered by the 
program.  
 
13 “Pigouvian” is meant to describe a tax that would be consistent with Pigou’s prescription that a 
tax equal to the marginal social harm from pollution should be imposed to provide just the right 
amount of disincentive for pollution: A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, 3d ed. (London: 
MacMillan, 1929) at 133-37. Taxes that reflected the extent of negative externality thus became 
known as “Pigouvian” taxes. See William J. Baumol & Wallace E. Oates, The Theory of 
Environmental Policy, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) at 21-23 (“In sum ... 
the proper corrective device is a Pigouvian tax equal to marginal social damage levied on the 
generator of the externality with no supplementary incentives for victims” at 23). See e.g. Tom 
Tietenberg, Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, 3d ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 
1992) (“We have shown that as long as the control authority imposes the same emission charge on all 
sources, the resulting reduction allocation automatically minimizes the costs of control” at 373 
[emphasis in original]); Paul A. Samuelson, Economics, 11th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1980) (“Economists propose that greater use be made of pricing mechanisms. Taxes are to 
be put on firms and industries that put out effluents into the air and ground” at 744). 
14 See text accompanying notes 57-68. 
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 Finally, some regulation may be achieved by using an existing federal statute, the 
CEA Act. The CEA Act requires an environmental assessment for projects proposed 
by a federal authority or receiving financial assistance from a federal authority, for 
any sale or lease of federal lands, or for any federal action or allowance that 
implicates an area of federal concern identified by regulation.15 The “environment” is 
construed broadly, encompassing “air, including all layers of the atmosphere.”16 The 
CEA Act already plays a powerful environmental role in requiring assessment of 
almost all significant federal projects, and it might be deployed in a similar manner in 
requiring agencies to consider the greenhouse gas implications of federal projects, 
much as they already consider other environmental impacts. This regulatory option is 
different from the other options in that it is a procedural one, and not one aimed at 
achieving any substantive outcome. 
B. Federal Attempts at Greenhouse Gas Regulation 
 In 2007, under international pressure, Prime Minister Harper dragged the 
Conservative Party into the climate change discussion, announcing an intention to 
reduce Canada’s total emissions of greenhouse gases to 20 per cent below 2006 levels 
by the year 2020, and 60 per cent to 70 per cent below 2006 levels by 2050.17 The 
Harper plan is an intensity-based emissions trading program that covers most 
greenhouse gas–emitting industries, including the electricity generation, oil and gas, 
aluminum, cement, and pulp and paper industries. Large facilities in existence before 
2004 will have 2010 reduction targets of 18 per cent below 2006 levels, with 2 per 
cent further reductions annually.18 “New facilities” (with a first year of operation after 
2003) will be required to achieve intensity reductions of 2 per cent annually after the 
third year of operation.19 Oil sands facilities coming online after 2012 must install 
carbon capture and storage technology.20 As noted above, it is difficult to determine 
how much emissions reduction an intensity-based emissions trading program will 
actually achieve, because the number of allowances is keyed to productive output. If 
there is economic pressure on output, then improvements in productive efficiency will 
lead to the availability of more emissions allowances, thereby lifting the ceiling on 
emissions.  
 Government projections of a 20 per cent decrease from 2006 levels by the year 
2020 are hard to evaluate, based as they are on a complicated macroeconomic 
 
15 CEA Act, supra note 9, s. 5(1). 
16 Ibid., s. 2(1). 
17 Environment Canada, Turning the Corner: Regulatory Framework for Industrial Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions (Minister of Environment, March 2008) at 7, online: Government of Canada <http://www. 
ec.gc.ca/doc/virage-corner/2008-03/pdf/COM-541_Framework.pdf> [Environment Canada, Regulatory 
Framework].  
18 Ibid. at 3. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. at 11. 
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model,21 but they clearly incorporate some optimistic assumptions. For example, the 
model assumes that by the year 2020, the following will occur: despite the absence of 
federal regulation, passenger and freight transportation efficiency, along with some 
questionably large gains in automobile efficiency, will reduce emissions by thirty-five 
megatonnes from a business-as-usual forecast;22 the East-West transmission grid will 
be expanded to transport clean power across Canada,23 a project that will require 
considerable inter-jurisdictional cooperation; contributions into a “Technology Fund” 
will somehow generate twenty megatonnes of emission reduction;24 and offsets from 
the agricultural and forestry sectors—greenhouse gas–reducing actions that would not 
have otherwise been undertaken—will produce almost fifty-five megatonnes of 
reduction.25 It may be unduly skeptical to discount these assumptions, but considering 
the fanfare with which the federal government announced its intentions, these 
assumptions seem like a tenuous foundation upon which to make such specific 
claims. 
 Despite mutual criticism between the Liberal and Conservative parties over 
greenhouse gas regulation, the current proposal bears an odd resemblance to a plan 
rolled out in 2005 by then–Prime Minister Paul Martin, in that it is an intensity-based 
emissions trading program that covers roughly the same set of seven hundred or so 
“large final emitters” and allows contribution to a “Greenhouse Gas Technology 
Fund” to substitute for actually achieving the mandated emissions intensity 
improvements.26 If, as opposition parties and environmental groups have argued, the 
current plan is insufficient,27 then the previous Martin plan was delusional. The 
Martin plan was in large part an intensity-based emissions trading plan for large final 
emitters, and the remaining four-fifths of the emissions reductions were projected to 
occur as a result of a variety of vague spending programs, such as the Greenhouse 
Gas Technology Fund.28 To put it bluntly, the Martin Plan consisted of a modest 
 
21 Environment Canada developed a model called the Energy-Economy-Environment Model for 
Canada, which incorporates a variety of economic factors, many of which are global in nature. See 
National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, “Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Forecasting: Learning from International Best Practices”, online: National Round Table on the 
Environment and the Economy <http://www.trnee-nrtee.ca/eng/publications/greenhouse-gases-
forecasting/section1-ghg-forecasting-php>. 
22 Environment Canada, Turning the Corner: Detailed Emissions and Economic Modelling 
(Minister of Environment, March 2008) at 10, online: Government of Canada <http://www.ec. 
gc.ca/doc/virage-corner/2008-03/571/p1_eng.pdf>. 
23 Ibid. at 11.  
24 Ibid. at 6. 
25 Ibid. at 11. 
26 Environment Canada, Regulatory Framework, supra note 17 at 14.  
27 “MPs, Environmentalists Slam Greenhouse Gas Targets” CBC News (26 April 2007), online: 
CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/04/26/emission-reac html>. 
28 For a critical analysis of the plan, see Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and 
Sustainable Development to the House of Commons, Chapter 1: Managing the Federal Approach to 
Climate Change (Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General, 2006) at 21-25. 
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emissions-trading plan and a collection of bald assertions about the effectiveness of 
spending money on undefined research projects. 
 The Martin plan did contain an interesting twist, however: the emissions trading 
plan for large final emitters included a “safety valve” provision that guaranteed that 
the price of an allowance to emit a tonne of CO2 would not exceed fifteen dollars 
during the 2008–2012 period.29 Such safety valves are not new to environmental 
economics.30 If the safety valve level is low enough, it sets the price of emissions and 
essentially creates a carbon tax.31 By most accounts, fifteen dollars per tonne is a low 
level, and as noted above, the fact that the program was intensity-based means that 
allowances could be plentiful enough to drive the price still lower.32 The interesting 
question is why such an elaborate emissions trading plan with a safety valve would be 
put in place if the goal was essentially to tax emissions at a maximum of fifteen 
dollars per tonne. Could some sort of a tax scheme not be devised to achieve the same 
thing, but in a much simpler fashion? 
 There are two answers to this question, one psychological and one political. The 
psychological answer harkens back to the special aversion to all policies bearing the 
word “tax”, especially in Alberta.33 “Taxes” per se are so unpopular in North America 
that economists have argued that a safety valve is a way of introducing a tax-like 
mechanism without necessarily introducing the “baggage” of emissions taxes.34 
 But there is another interesting aspect to this question: how did the figure of 
fifteen dollars per tonne come about? The answer is not, as one might think, that it 
represented the acceptable level for those in Albertan oil and gas industries. Fifteen 
dollars per tonne would have represented a tax of about six dollars and sixty cents per 
barrel of oil,35 and a mere four cents per litre of gasoline—a cost that could almost 
 
29 Notice of Intent to regulate greenhouse gas emissions by Large Final Emitters, supra note 12 at 
2491; Greenhouse Gas Technology Investment Fund Act, s. 8(5), being Part 14 of the Budget 
Implementation Act, 2005, S.C. 2005, c. 30, s. 96. 
30 See e.g. Henry D. Jacoby & A. Denny Ellerman, “The Safety Valve and Climate Policy” (2004) 
32 Energy Policy 481; Marc J. Roberts & Michael Spence, “Effluent Charges and Licenses under 
Uncertainty” (1976) 5 Journal of Public Economics 193; Willam A. Pizer, “Prices vs. Quantities 
Revisited: The Case of Climate Change” (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 98-02, 1997), 
online: Resources for the Future <http://www rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-98-02.pdf>.  
31 Jacoby & Ellerman, ibid. at 481. 
32 See e.g. Jacoby & Ellerman, ibid. at 484.  
33 “Carbon Tax Proposal a Non-Starter in Alberta” CBC News (8 January 2008), online: CBC News 
<http://www.cbc.ca/canada/calgary/story/2008/01/08/renner-carbon html>.  
34 See e.g. Jacoby & Ellerman, supra note 30 at 484; Willam A. Pizer, “Choosing Prices or Quantity 
Controls for Greenhouse Gases” (Resources for the Future Climate Issues Brief No. 17, 1999), online: 
Resources for the Future <http://www rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-CCIB-17.pdf> (“the advantages of a 
carbon tax can be achieved without the baggage accompanying an actual tax” at 9).  
35 A carbon tax levied on production of a barrel of oil would measure the carbon content on a barrel, 
and one could levy the tax against the producer. The carbon content of crude oil is approximately 19.9 
metric tonnes per terrajoule, or 0.0199 tonnes per gigajoule. A barrel of oil typically contains 6.1 
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invisibly be passed on to the gasoline consumer. It was not Alberta that insisted on 
this safety valve. 
 The answer is a political one. It can be found in the ridings that the Liberal 
government was most afraid of losing in the imminent federal election: 
manufacturing-heavy, greenhouse gas–intensive ridings in Southern Ontario. 
Pandering to Alberta would have done the Liberal Party no good, but minimizing 
defection to the Conservative Party in Liberal ridings was critical to preserving a 
Liberal minority government. For example, the Ancaster-Dundas-Flamborough-
Westdale riding is home to the Carmeuse Lime production facility, which emitted 
over six hundred thousand tonnes of CO2 in 200436 (about three-quarters of Ontario’s 
lime production emissions37). That riding saw very close races in 2004 and 2006: 
Liberal candidate Russ Powers narrowly defeated Conservative candidate David 
Sweet by 40 per cent to 36 per cent in 2004,38 only to have that advantage reversed in 
a 2006 loss.39 In the extremely greenhouse gas–intensive riding of Sarnia-Lambton, 
facilities belonging to Cabot Canada, Imperial Oil, Suncor, BP Canada, TransAlta 
Energy, and NOVA Chemicals emitted a reported total of over 4.52 megatonnes of 
CO2 in 200640—over 6 per cent of all of Ontario’s emissions. That riding saw a 
similar flip in a tight race, with Liberal MP Roger Gallaway narrowly winning in 
                                                                                                                                       
gigajoules, so the carbon content of a barrel of oil is typically 0.12 tonnes. The tax is on emissions of a 
tonne of CO2, which has a molecular weight of 44, as opposed to carbon, which has the molecular 
weight of 12. Emitting 0.12 tonnes of carbon would thus be the same as emitting 0.44 tonnes of CO2. 
With a tax of $15 per tonne of CO2, the tax on a barrel of oil would be about $6.60 per barrel. There 
are forty-two U.S. gallons of gasoline to a barrel, so that this tax amounted to about 15¢ per gallon of 
gasoline (Bioenergy Feedstock Information Network, Bioenergy Conversion Factors, online: 
Bioenergy Feedstock Information Network <http://bioenergy.ornl.gov/papers/misc/energy_ 
conv html>). World crude oil prices ranged from $35 per barrel to $60 per barrel in 2005 (U.S. 
Department of Energy, Weekly All Countries Spot Price FOB Weighted by Estimated Export Volume, 
online: Energy Information Administration <http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/wtotworldw htm>. 
36 Environment Canada, 2004 Emissions Data, Table 3: Summary of GHG Emissions by Facility, 
online: Environment Canada <http://www.ec.gc.ca/pdb/ghg/onlineData/docs/t3y2004_e.pdf>.  
37 Environment Canada, National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Report, 1990-2004: Greenhouse Gas 
Sources and Sinks in Canada, Annex 12: Provincial / Territorial Greenhouse Gas Emission Tables, 
1990–2004, online: Environment Canada <http://www.ec.gc.ca/pdb/ghg/inventory_report/2004_ 
report/ta12_13_e.cfm>.  
38 CBC News, Canada Votes 2004, online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/canadavotes2004/ 
riding/110/>. 
39 CBC News, Canada Votes 2006, online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/canadavotes2006/ 
riding/110/>. 
40 Environment Canada, 2006 Emissions Data, Table 3: Summary of GHG Emissions by Facility, 
online: Environment Canada <http://www.ec.gc.ca/pdb/ghg/onlineData/kdt_t3_e.cfm?year=2006> 
[Environment Canada, 2006 Emissions Data, Table 3]. Ontario’s total CO2 emissions in 2006 were 
71.4 megatonnes (Environment Canada, 2006 Emissions Data, Table 2: GHG Emissions by 
Provinces/Territories, online: Environment Canada <http://www.ec.gc.ca/pdb/ghg/onlineData/kdt_t2_ 
e.cfm?year=2006>). 
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2004 but losing to a Conservative in 2006.41 The Liberal Party did manage to hang on 
to their Mississauga South riding, home to Petro-Canada and St. Lawrence Cement 
plants, the sources of another 1.72 million tonnes of CO2 emissions;42 but Liberal 
incumbent Paul Szabo’s margin of victory shrunk from eighteen points in 2004 to 
four in 2006.43  
 Politicians are particularly sensitive when talking about greenhouse gas 
regulation in Southern Ontario because many of the region’s industries, such as 
automobile manufacturing (both parts production and assembly), lime and cement 
manufacturing, and chemical manufacturing, are vulnerable to trade pressures. 
Carbon taxes are particularly unwelcome in an economically distressed environment. 
The suffering and high-emitting automotive industry is always nervous about 
greenhouse gas regulation. Indeed, some of Ontario’s most competitive ridings, such 
as the St. Catharines and Oshawa ridings,44 are home to General Motors truck and car 
assembly plants. Rather than imposing vehicle fuel efficiency regulations on the 
Canadian auto industry, the 2005 Liberal Plan instead entered into a memorandum of 
understanding with the industry, calling for a reduction of 5.3 megatonnes per year by 
2010.45 This was an unambitious target, given that road vehicles accounted for 135 
megatonnes of greenhouse gas emissions in 2005.46  
 Ontario also produces almost half of Canada’s cement,47 40 per cent of which is 
exported to the United States.48 In a highly competitive world market, imposing added 
costs upon Canadian cement manufacturers might affect their competitiveness, 
causing their world market share to fall. A cement industry spokesperson reports that 
cement imported from China is only slightly more expensive than that made in North 
America. The difference between Canadian cement and Chinese cement landing in 
 
41 CBC News, Canada Votes 2004, online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/canadavotes2004/ 
riding/185>; CBC News, Canada Votes 2006, online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/ 
canadavotes2006/riding/185>. 
42 Environment Canada, 2006 Emissions Data, Table 3, supra note 40. 
43 CBC News, Canada Votes 2004, online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/canadavotes2004/ 
riding/157>; CBC News, Canada Votes 2006, online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/ 
canadavotes2006/riding/157>. 
44 In 2004, Conservative Colin Carrie won the Oshawa riding by a less than 1 per cent margin (CBC 
News, Canada Votes 2004, online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/canadavotes2004/riding/168/>), 
and in 2006, Conservative Rick Dykstra won the St. Catharines riding by 0.42 per cent (CBC News, 
Canada Votes 2006, online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/canadavotes2006/riding/183>). 
45 Natural Resources Canada, Automakers Agreement to Reduce GHG Emissions, online: Natural 
Resources Canada <http://oee nrcan.gc.ca/transportation/ghg-memorandum/index.cfm>.  
46 Environment Canada, National Inventory Report, 1990–2005: Greenhouse Gas Sources and 
Sinks in Canada, Table S-3, online: Environment Canada <http://www.ec.gc.ca/pdb/ghg/inventory_ 
report/2005_report/ts_3_eng.cfm>.  
47 Ontario Ministry of Northern Development, Mines, and Forestry, Cement Production and 
Quarrying in Ontario (June 2009), online: Government of Ontario <http://www mndm.gov.on.ca/ 
mines/ogs/resgeol/rfe/commodity/cement.pdf>.  
48 Cement Association of Canada, Backgrounder, “Cement” [unpublished, on file with author]. 
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Seattle is about fifteen dollars per tonne.49 Because the cement industry emits 
greenhouse gases at the rate of very roughly one tonne of CO2 to one tonne of 
finished cement,50 a fifteen dollar per tonne tax on CO2 would exactly offset the 
competitive advantage currently enjoyed by Canadian cement manufacturers over 
their Chinese competitors. Could this fact have given rise to the fifteen dollar per 
tonne safety valve? Certainly, no government official or cement industry 
representative would admit as much, but the coincidence is curious. 
 The safety valve, then, seems to have been aimed not at protecting Alberta’s oil 
and gas interests, but at protecting Ontario manufacturing interests and addressing the 
fear that manufacturing jobs would be lost to the United States, which had no 
prospect of greenhouse gas regulation in 2005. But Canadian public opinion, and 
Ontarian public opinion in particular, has never been as fearful of greenhouse gas 
regulation as federal politicians assume. Greenhouse gas–intensive (and supposedly 
fearful) Ontario has joined Quebec, British Columbia, and Manitoba in the Western 
Climate Initiative, a California-led state and provincial effort to reduce greenhouse 
gases.51 The federal government has always seemed to trail public opinion and even 
industry opinion on greenhouse gas regulation. While Canada’s constitution might 
appear to present obstacles to greenhouse gas regulation, closer inspection reveals 
that this is not the case. The only obstacles are political, and even these are not 
necessarily accurately perceived.  
C. Provincial Experiences with Greenhouse Gas Regulation 
 While greenhouse gas policy has been a political football at the federal level, 
provincial governments have largely gone their own separate ways in developing (or 
not developing) greenhouse gas policies. In 2002, Alberta announced its plan to 
reduce carbon intensity to 50 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020.52 Again, no actual 
emissions reduction was required, only an improvement in the rate of greenhouse gas 
emissions per unit of output. The non-profit Pembina Institute issued an analysis 
showing that the intensity targets were so lax they could have allowed a 72 per cent 
increase in emissions by 2020.53 
 
49 Email from Martin Vroegh, Environment Manager, St. Marys Cement Inc., to Patrick O’Brien, 
(15 July 2008) [on file with author]. 
50 Ibid. 
51 See text accompanying note 68. 
52 Climate Change and Emissions Management Act, S.A. 2003, c. C-16.7, s. 3. 
53 Pembina Institute, Media Release, “An Embarrassing Week for Albertans: Stelmach’s Proposals 
on Climate Change Will Actually Legislate an Increase in Emissions” (9 March 2007), online: 
Pembina Institute <http://www.pembina.org/media-release/1387>.  
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 An updated plan was announced in 2007, which called for an interim set of 
intensity targets to be met by 2010.54 The government of Alberta also announced that 
it would embark upon a program to fund carbon capture and storage, an end-of-pipe 
technology that captures CO2 as it leaves the smokestack and pipes it to underground 
caverns to be stored in perpetuity.55 Generally sticking with its 2002 plan, Alberta 
projected that its emissions in 2050 would be 14 per cent lower than in 2005. Like the 
federal government, the Alberta government underscored the fact that the 2050 
emissions reductions would be 50 per cent below business-as-usual levels,56 which 
certainly sounds like an improvement. But that statistic compares the emissions 
reduction with a projected upward trajectory of future emissions growth; the Alberta 
government is essentially congratulating itself for diverging from its current 
profligacy. 
 British Columbia and Quebec have implemented carbon taxes levied at the point 
of sale, in essence a sales tax on fossil fuels sold in those provinces. This approach 
has many administrative advantages, as the wholesale or retail purchase of fossil fuel 
is an easily trackable transaction and therefore a convenient enforcement point. In 
general, carbon taxes are administratively simpler to design and carry out than any 
emissions trading scheme, particularly an intensity-based scheme.  
 The Quebec carbon tax applies to the distribution within the province of 
“gasoline, diesel fuel, heating oil, propane, petroleum coke or coal, but not aviation 
fuel, marine bunker fuel, hydrocarbons used as raw material by industries that 
transform hydrocarbon molecules through chemical or petrochemical processes or 
renewable fuel content.”57 The carbon tax is administered by the Regie de l’energie, 
the provincial energy regulatory agency, which determines the tax rate annually by 
“[t]aking into account greenhouse gas reduction targets ... and the overall financial 
investment.”58 The actual levy paid by distributors of fossil fuels is determined at the 
end of the year by dividing the desired amount of “annual financial investment” into a 
“Green Fund” by the total amount of carbon emissions,59 then calculating each 
distributor’s share of those emissions, taking into account the carbon content of 
different fossil fuels.60 Fossil fuels sold in Quebec are presumed to be intended for 
 
54 Specified Gas Emitters Regulation, Alta. Reg. 139/2007, ss. 3-4; Alberta, State of the 
Environment—Climate Change: Greenhouse Gas Emissions Intensity, online: Government of Alberta 
<http://www3.gov.ab.ca/env/soe/climate_indicators/15_ghg html>.  
55 Alberta, News Release, “Alberta to Cut Projected Emissions by 50 per cent under New Climate 
Change Plan” (24 January 2008), online: Government of Alberta <http://alberta.ca/home/NewsFrame. 
cfm?ReleaseID=/acn/200801/22943ACC446ED-ED74-6A1E-6CF263E59920969B html>.  
56 Alberta, Alberta’s 2008 Climate Change Strategy: Responsibility/Leadership/Action (January 
2008) at 7, online: Government of Alberta <http://environment.gov.ab.ca/info/library/7894.pdf>. 
57 An Act respecting the Régie de l’énergie, R.S.Q. c. R-6.01, s. 85.34, s.v. “fuel”. 
58 Ibid, s. 85.36. 
59 Regulation respecting the annual duty payable to the Green Fund, R.Q. c. R-6.01, r. 6, s. 2. 
60 Ibid., s. 4. 
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consumption in Quebec unless otherwise shown by the distributor.61 Quebec’s carbon 
tax took effect in 2007.62 
 In 2008, British Columbia enacted a carbon tax of ten dollars per tonne of carbon 
emissions (as measured by the carbon content).63 The tax increases by five dollars per 
year to thirty dollars per tonne in 2012. For gasoline, the tax amounted to 2.34¢ per 
litre in 2008, set to increase to 7.09¢ per litre by 2012. Diesel fuel and home heating 
oil start at a tax of 2.69¢ per litre and rise to 8.09¢ by 2012.64 An important political 
element of this plan was the stated intention to make the carbon tax revenue neutral 
by somehow returning revenues from the tax to provincial residents and firms. 
Forecasted tax revenues seem to allow the B.C. Ministry of Finance to announce 
lump sum payments as well as specific cuts in corporate, small business, and personal 
income tax rates.65 Notably, the lump sum payments and the personal income tax 
reductions are tilted towards lower-income British Columbians to address perceptions 
that consumption-based taxes such as carbon taxes and gasoline taxes are 
regressive.66  
 In addition, the British Columbia government has passed an act providing for a 
cap-and-trade program that, when it comes into force, will apply to greenhouse gas 
emitters within the province.67 Almost all of the specifics of the program have been 
left to regulations, which is understandable given the province’s commitment to 
participate in the California-led emissions-trading reduction plan, the Western 
Climate Initiative, the details of which have not been finalized.68  
 Manitoba, which has also joined the Western Climate Initiative, announced that it 
intends to legislate a commitment to meeting its share of Canada’s Kyoto targets: a 6 
per cent reduction in greenhouse gases below 1990 levels.69 Unfortunately, 
Manitoba’s plan seems predicated on the same creative accounting employed by the 
 
61 Ibid., s. 5. 
62 Ibid., s. 9. 
63 Carbon Tax Act, S.B.C. 2008, c. 40, Sch. 1(1), Table 1. 
64 Ibid.  
65 British Columbia, Balanced Budget 2008, Backgrounder: B.C.’s Revenue-Neutral Carbon Tax 
(2008), online: Government of British Columbia <http://www.bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/2008/backgrounders/ 
2008_Backgrounder_Carbon_Tax.pdf>.  
66 The “Climate Action Credit” provides an annual lump sum payment of $100 per adult and $30 
per child, increasing in future years. Personal income tax rates will be reduced on the first $70 000 in 
earnings (ibid. at 2). The actual determination of whether a gasoline tax is regressive or not is 
complicated. For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 208-13. 
67 Greenhouse Gas Reduction (Cap and Trade) Act, S.B.C. 2008, c. 32 (assented to 29 May 2008).  
68 See Western Climate Initiative, online: Western Climate Initiative <http://www.westernclimate 
initiative.org/>.  
69 Manitoba, News Release, “Beyond Kyoto Outlines Manitoba’s Green Future: Rondeau” (21 April 
2008), online: Government of Manitoba <http://www.gov mb.ca/chc/press/top/2008/04/2008-04-21-
100300-3541 html>.  
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last two federal governments.70 It measures emissions reduction in terms of its 
divergence from a business-as-usual baseline. For example, Manitoba credits itself 
with 1.1 megatonnes of greenhouse gas reduction for construction of the Wuskwatim 
Hydro Generation Project, which will generate electricity for export out of the 
province.71 While this hydro project may be a laudable way to meet increasing 
electricity demands, it is a bit self-serving to call the construction of a dam an 
emissions “reduction”. 
 Ontario and Quebec are also jumping on board with the Western Climate 
Initiative. In 2008, those provinces entered into a biprovincial memorandum of 
understanding, agreeing to agree on a joint cap-and-trade scheme.72 While details are 
lacking, a joint initiative of the two most populous Canadian provinces is clearly a 
signal of widespread impatience with federal efforts. Ontario’s initiative also defies 
federal politicians’ expectations that greenhouse gas regulation would be a political 
hot potato in that greenhouse gas–intensive manufacturing region. 
 Curbing greenhouse gas emissions in Canada will obviously be challenging, as it 
will be for any industrialized country subject to Kyoto targets. But an overly cynical 
treatment of the greenhouse gas problem as a political football and the dubious use of 
business-as-usual baseline calculations are surely not helping matters. These tactics, 
along with the perception in some quarters that constitutional barriers exist, pose 
unnecessary obstacles to the formation of meaningful greenhouse gas regulation. 
British Columbia and Quebec have certainly taken a lead in greenhouse gas 
regulation; but the magnitude of the greenhouse gas reductions that are required of 
Canada necessitates a federal response, and one that is considerably more serious than 
any proposed to date. 
II. The Constitutional Dimension 
 The validity under sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 of legislation 
enacted by the federal and provincial orders of government to regulate greenhouse 
gas emissions will depend on a number of factors.73 One of these is obviously the 
 
70 Manitoba, Kyoto and Beyond: Meeting and Exceeding Our Kyoto Targets, online: Government of 
Manitoba <http://www.climatechangeconnection.org/Resources/documents/kyoto_plan.pdf>.  
71 Ibid. at 3. 
72 Ontario, Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Ontario and the 
Government of Quebec: A Provincial-Territorial Cap and Trade Initiative (2 June 2008), online: 
Government of Ontario <http://www.premier.gov.on.ca/news/event.php?ItemID=373&Lang=En>.  
73 The jurisdictional question addressed in this part of the paper has been discussed in one form or 
another by a number of authors already. See e.g. Chris Rolfe, Turning Down the Heat: Emissions 
Trading and Canadian Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol (Vancouver: West Coast Environmental 
Law Research Foundation, 1998); Joseph F. Castrilli, “Legal Authority for Emissions Trading in 
Canada” in Elizabeth Atkinson, ed., The Legislative Authority to Implement a Domestic Emissions 
Trading System (Ottawa: National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, 1999); Philip 
Barton, “Economic Instruments and the Kyoto Protocol: Can Parliament Implement Emissions 
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precise nature of the legislation enacted. Some kinds of legislation will be easier to 
defend than others. For example, there is little reason to doubt that under subsection 
91(3), the federal order of government has the power to enact legislation imposing a 
carbon tax.74  
 Another factor is the extant body of jurisprudence governing the scope and 
meaning of the various heads of federal and provincial power in sections 91 and 92, 
which the two orders of government would rely on in support of their legislation. In 
the case of some of the relevant heads of power—Parliament’s power to legislate for 
the “Peace, Order and Good Government of Canada” (POGG), for example—the 
courts have formulated reasonably comprehensive definitions or tests. In the case of 
others—the provincial legislatures’ power to legislate in relation to “Property and 
Civil Rights in the Province”, for example—our understanding of their scope and 
meaning is based on a series of decisions rendered over a long period of time that tell 
us which kinds of “matters” come within the head of power and which do not. In 
either case, judges often have a good deal of leeway when called upon to apply the 
extant jurisprudence in a specific case.  
 A third factor is the set of analytical tools the courts have created to assist them in 
characterizing particular legislative enactments for division of powers purposes, and 
the manner in which those tools would be used in the context of challenges to 
particular legislative enactments. That characterization process—the determination of 
the impugned legislation’s true “matter” or “pith and substance”—is critical to the 
outcome of a constitutional attack on division of powers grounds. The parties to the 
challenge will each advance one or more characterizations that, in their view, will 
improve their chances of obtaining a favourable result. While the tools judges use to 
make that determination do serve to constrain the choices available to them in this 
regard, those tools are nevertheless sufficiently malleable to leave judges with a great 
deal of room to manoeuvre in many cases. 
 A fourth factor is the attitude that the judiciary will bring to bear on the task of 
reviewing the constitutionality of legislation in this area. It is this factor that will 
influence the choices judges make in exercising the discretion they have in such 
cases. The judicial attitudes that will matter most are attitudes towards Canadian 
federalism, both generally and in the specific context of environmental protection, 
and, more particularly, attitudes towards the goals underlying attempts to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. Some judges can be expected to have centralist leanings, 
either generally or in this specific context, others to have provincialist leanings, and 
still others to be agnostic and therefore receptive to shared jurisdiction in this area. 
                                                                                                                                       
Trading Without Provincial Co-operation?” (2002) 40 Alta. L. Rev. 417; Nigel D. Bankes & Alastair 
R. Lucas, “Kyoto, Constitutional Law and Alberta’s Proposals” (2004) 42 Alta. L. Rev. 355. It should 
be noted that the conclusions reached by these various authors in relation to the specific issues they 
considered were far from unanimous. 
74 But see Nathalie J. Chalifour, “Making Federalism Work for Climate Change: Canada’s Division 
of Powers over Carbon Taxes” (2008) 22 N.J.C.L. 119. 
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Receptivity to both orders of government legislating in this area will likely be 
enhanced by an acceptance of the importance of the goals underlying such attempts. 
 The fact that the validity of legislation depends on so many factors means that 
confident predictions are difficult to make. While we make a number of predictions in 
this article about the likelihood of certain kinds of legislative initiatives being open to 
the two orders of government in this paper, we do not wish to be taken as having 
committed ourselves unreservedly to those views. 
 We begin with three general observations about the manner in which the Supreme 
Court of Canada has tended to approach the task of reviewing environmental 
legislation on federalism grounds. First, the Court has made it clear that the power to 
protect the environment does not reside exclusively with either Parliament or the 
provincial legislatures. As Justice LaForest put it on behalf of an eight-member 
majority in Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport):  
[T]he Constitution Act, 1867 has not assigned the matter of “environment” sui 
generis to either the provinces or Parliament. The environment, as understood 
in its generic sense, encompasses the physical, economic and social 
environment touching several of the heads of power assigned to the respective 
levels of government.75  
Justice LaForest in fact went so far as to say that the environment in this broad sense 
was “a constitutionally abstruse matter which does not comfortably fit within the 
existing division of powers without considerable overlap and uncertainty.”76  
 The jurisprudence makes it clear that this connection to heads of power on both 
sides of the federal-provincial divide is present even if the word “environment” is 
understood in more limited terms to mean the physical environment alone. Hence, the 
courts have upheld both federal77 and provincial78 legislation designed to protect the 
physical environment. They have been able to do so in part because of their 
willingness to permit Parliament and the provincial legislatures to rely on their 
respective jurisdictions over both causes and effects of polluting activities.79 For 
example, Parliament can regulate the polluting activities of interprovincial railways 
because it has jurisdiction over “Railways ... connecting [one] Province with any 
other or others of the Provinces” under paragraph 92(10)(a). It can also regulate 
 
75 [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3 at 63, 88 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [Oldman River]. 
76 Ibid. at 64. 
77 See e.g. R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401, 49 D.L.R. (4th) 161 [Crown 
Zellerbach cited to S.C.R.] (upholding the legislation under POGG); R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 
S.C.R. 213, 151 D.L.R. (4th) 32 [Hydro-Québec cited to S.C.R.] (using the criminal law power under 
s. 91(27)). 
78 See e.g. R. v. Lake Ontario Cement Ltd., [1973] 2 O.R. 247, 35 D.L.R. (3d) 109 (using s. 92(13) 
and 92(16) together). 
79 The term “effects” in this context is intended to refer to environmental damage to places, entities, 
or activities that is caused by the polluting activity in question. 
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polluting activities that harm the fisheries80 and the waters of the territorial sea81 
because it has jurisdiction over “seacoast and inland fisheries” and the territorial sea 
under subsection 91(12) and the POGG power, respectively. Similarly, it is generally 
understood that the provincial legislatures can regulate the polluting activities of the 
mining and manufacturing industries because they have jurisdiction over the business 
activities of those industries under “property and civil rights” in subsection 92(13).82 
Provincial legislatures can also regulate polluting activities that harm provincial 
Crown lands and inland waterways because they have jurisdiction over such lands 
and waterways under subsections 92(5) and 92(13), and/or 92(16), respectively.83 
 The courts’ willingness to approach the validity of environmental protection 
legislation in this manner contributes greatly to the “considerable overlap” of federal 
and provincial legislation in this area noted by Justice LaForest in Oldman River. The 
same polluting activities can, in theory, be regulated by both orders of government—
one on the basis of its jurisdiction over the cause of those activities and the other on 
the basis of its jurisdiction over the entities or places experiencing the effects. For 
example, a shipping company whose routes include waters that feed into local 
waterways can at one and the same time be subject to federal legislation (enacted 
under subsection 91(10)) and provincial legislation (enacted under subsections 92(13) 
or 92(16)).84 Only if the provincial enactment can be said to conflict with the federal, 
thereby triggering the application of the doctrine of federal paramountcy, will the 
shipping company be able to avoid the application of the former. Even under the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s new approach to the doctrine of federal paramountcy, this 
is not an easy hurdle to meet.85  
 The second observation is that the Supreme Court of Canada has permitted 
Parliament to regulate certain kinds of polluting activities under its POGG and 
criminal law (subsection 91(27)) powers even though it has had to push the doctrinal 
 
80 See e.g. Northwest Falling Contractors Ltd. v. R., [1980] 2 S.C.R. 292, 113 D.L.R. (3d) 1. 
81 All seven of the judges in Crown Zellerbach agreed with this proposition in obiter (supra note 
77). 
82 See Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2008 student ed. (Toronto: Thompson 
Carswell, 2008) c. 30.7, [Hogg, Constitutional Law]. The use of this head of power to sustain 
provincial legislation regulating industries such as these is a function of the early jurisprudence of the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. See e.g. Canada (A.G.) v. Alberta (A.G.) (Reference Re 
Insurance Companies), [1916] 1 A.C. 588, 26 D.L.R. 288 (P.C.) [Insurance Reference cited to A.C.]; 
Reference Re the Board of Commerce Act, 1919, and the Combines and Fair Prices Act, 1919 (1921), 
[1922] 1 A.C. 191 (P.C.) [Board of Commerce Reference].  
83 There is no direct authority in support of this proposition that we are aware of, but in our view, it 
can be said to be implicit in the approach taken to the division of legislative authority over the 
environment in the majority reasons for judgment in Oldman River (supra note 75). 
84 This assumes, of course, that the provincial legislation is directed at the protection of the local 
waterways rather than at the polluting activities of ships per se. 
85 See Robin Elliot, “Safeguarding Provincial Autonomy from the Supreme Court’s New Federal 
Paramountcy Doctrine: A Constructive Role for the Intention to Cover the Field Test?” (2007) 38 Sup. 
Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 629. 
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envelopes governing those two heads of power in order to do so. In Crown 
Zellerbach, decided in 1988, the Court upheld the federal Ocean Dumping Control 
Act86 on the basis of the national concern branch of the POGG power. It did so in 
spite of the fact that, as the dissenting judges pointed out, the “matter” attributed to 
this act (marine pollution), arguably lacked the characteristics required under the 
national concern rubric.87 In Hydro-Québec, decided in 1997, the Court upheld the 
toxic substances provisions of the CEP Act88 under subsection 91(27) in spite of the 
fact that, again as the dissenting judges pointed out, the provisions looked to be far 
more regulatory than prohibitory in nature.89 Taken together, these two decisions can 
be said to reflect a willingness on the part of the Supreme Court of Canada to use the 
room to manoeuvre that the doctrine in this area leaves them with to afford the federal 
government broad authority to protect the physical environment. These cases also 
reflect a high degree of sympathy on the Court’s part for the goal of environmental 
protection.  
 Hydro-Québec can also be said to reflect the Court’s growing preference for 
permitting both orders of government to legislate in furtherance of that goal. Justice 
LaForest, who authored the majority reasons in the case, defended his use of 
subsection 91(27) to validate the CEP Act’s toxic substances provisions inter alia on 
the ground that “the use of the federal criminal law power in no way precludes the 
provinces from exercising their extensive powers under s. 92 to regulate and control 
the pollution of the environment either independently or to supplement federal 
action.”90 This feature of the federal criminal law power differentiates it from the 
national concern branch of POGG, which the federal government had advanced as an 
alternative basis upon which to sustain the toxic substance provisions. In other words, 
by upholding the provisions on the basis of subsection 91(27), the Court would in no 
way restrict the ability of the provincial legislatures to enact environmental protection 
legislation using the array of weapons available to them. 
 
86 S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 55. 
87 Supra note 77. There were three dissenting judges in this case: Beetz, Lamer, and LaForest JJ. 
Their reasons for judgment, authored by LaForest J., placed particular emphasis on the significant 
negative impact that sustaining the act on the basis of the national concern doctrine would have on 
provincial jurisdiction over the area in question (here, environmental protection), arguably the most 
important consideration courts are required to take into account when asked to uphold federal 
legislation under that rubric. See also Reference Re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, 68 D.L.R. 
(3d) 452 [Anti-Inflation Reference cited to S.C.R.]. 
88 Supra note 10. 
89 Supra note 77. The dissenting judges were Lamer C.J.C., Sopinka, Iacobucci, and Major JJ. Their 
reasons for judgment were co-authored by Lamer C.J.C. and Iacobucci J. The test that federal 
legislation has to meet in order to qualify as criminal law under s. 91(27) includes the requirement that 
the legislation be prohibitory in character. See Reference Re Validity of Section 5(a) of the Dairy 
Industry Act, [1949] S.C.R. 1, [1949] 1 D.L.R. 433 [Margarine Reference cited to S.C.R.]. It is worth 
noting that the majority in Hydro-Québec accepted this test as the governing one (supra note 77). 
90 Hydro-Québec, ibid. at para. 131. 
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 The third observation is as follows: the law is clear that the power to enact 
legislation in order to implement international treaty or convention obligations 
undertaken by the Government of Canada does not fall to Parliament simply because 
the legislation has been enacted for that purpose. As Lord Atkin of the Privy Council 
put it in the Labour Conventions Reference, “[f]or the purposes of ss. 91 and 92, ... 
there is no such thing as treaty legislation as such.”91 Jurisdiction to enact legislation 
that implements treaty obligations rests with the order of government that has 
jurisdiction to legislate in relation to the subject matter of those obligations. The 
federal order therefore cannot claim jurisdiction to enact legislation that regulates 
greenhouse gas emissions simply on the basis that such legislation is being enacted in 
fulfillment of Canada’s obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.92 
 That said, there is jurisprudential support for the notion that where federal 
legislation has been enacted to implement treaty obligations, this fact might assist the 
federal government’s cause if that legislation were to come under attack on federalism 
grounds, at least if the subject matter of the treaty relates to a matter of 
“predominantly extra-provincial as well as international character and implications.”93 
That language comes from Justice LeDain’s majority reasons for judgment in Crown 
Zellerbach, in which, as noted above, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the 
federal Ocean Dumping Control Act on the basis of the national concern branch of 
POGG. That statute had been enacted in fulfillment of Canada’s obligations under the 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other 
Matter,94 and Justice LeDain’s description of that treaty’s subject matter as being of 
“predominantly extra-provincial as well as international character and implications” 
appears to have been a significant factor in his reasoning. Given that the Kyoto 
Protocol clearly deals with a matter fitting that description, there is reason to believe 
that federal legislation regulating greenhouse gas emissions would be on stronger 
ground than it might otherwise be because of its connection to that treaty. 
A. Provincial Jurisdiction 
 In this part of the article, we consider whether the provincial legislatures have the 
requisite constitutional authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions through the 
 
91 Canada (A.G.) v. Ontario (A.G.) (Reference Re Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertakings Act, 
Minimum Wages Act and Limitation of Hours of Work Act), [1937] A.C. 326 at 351, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 
673 (P.C.) [Labour Conventions Reference]. 
92 But see Stewart Elgie, “Kyoto, the Constitution and Carbon Trading: Waking a Sleeping BNA 
Bear (or Two)” (2007) 13 Rev. Const. Stud. 67 at 90-103. 
93 Crown Zellerbach, supra note 77 at 436. 
94 29 December 1972, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120, U.K.T.S. 1976 No. 43 (entered into force 30 August 
1975). The Ocean Dumping Control Act went further in terms of its reach than this convention 
required Canada to go. It applied to internal marine waters as well as the territorial sea and other 
external marine waters. It did not, however, apply to inland waters (supra note 86). 
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vehicles of (1) a carbon tax, (2) a cap-and-trade or intensity-based trading regime, and 
(3) a command-and-control regime. 
1. Carbon Taxes 
 The provincial legislatures’ power to tax is prescribed by subsection 92(2) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 as the power to impose “Direct Taxation within the Province 
in order to the raising of a Revenue for Provincial Purposes.”95 Those terms suggest 
that in order for provincial legislation to be sustained on the basis of subsection 92(2), 
the legislation must (1) impose a tax, which must (2) be direct, (3) be imposed within 
the province, and (4) raise a provincial revenue.  
 Given the manner in which requirements (1), (2), and (3) have come to be 
understood, there is little doubt that provincial legislation establishing a carbon tax of 
the kind discussed above would be held to impose a tax that would be both direct and 
imposed within the province. The monies paid under such legislation would clearly 
be a tax. On the assumption that the tax was levied against consumers of the products 
in question in respect of the particular units of those products purchased, as the 
carbon tax in British Columbia is,96 that tax would be held to be a direct tax.97 Such a 
tax is in the nature of a sales tax levied against consumers, which the courts have long 
accepted as direct taxes. And the tax would be held to be levied within the province, 
because the only consumers required to pay it would likely be those who either 
purchase and consume the product in the province in which the tax is levied, or those 
who, as residents of or business-owners in that province, purchase the product 
elsewhere and bring it into the province for consumption.98 
 This leaves us with requirement (4): that the tax be levied “in order to the raising 
of a Revenue for Provincial Purposes.” On the face of it, that language appears to 
provide the basis for a challenge to a revenue-neutral provincial carbon tax like the 
one imposed by the Legislature of British Columbia.99 Arguably, a tax that is required 
by legislation to be revenue neutral, and is advertised as such, has not been levied “in 
order to the raising of a Revenue.” And if the tax has not been levied for that purpose, 
can it not be said that the legislation imposing it exceeds provincial jurisdiction under 
subsection 92(2)? 
 This argument would not rest on the text of subsection 92(2) alone. The Privy 
Council has given substantive content to similar language in subsection 92(9) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867, which authorizes provincial legislatures to legislate in relation 
 
95 Supra note 1. 
96 Carbon Tax Act, S.B.C. 2008, c. 40, ss. 8-13. 
97 The definition of a “direct tax” adopted by the courts is a tax that is levied against the very 
persons expected to bear the burden of it. For a discussion of this distinction and the relevant 
jurisprudence, see generally Hogg, supra note 82, c. 31.2, 31.7. 
98 Ibid., c. 31.11. 
99 See Carbon Tax Act, supra note 96, s. 3. 
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to “Shop, Saloon, Tavern, Auctioneer, and other Licences in order to the raising of a 
Revenue for Provincial, Local, or Municipal Purposes.” In Russell v. R., the Privy 
Council held that “the power of granting licences is not assigned to the Provincial 
Legislatures for the purpose of regulating trade, but ‘in order to the raising of a 
revenue for provincial, local, or municipal purposes.’ The Act in question is not a 
fiscal law; it is not a law for raising revenue.”100 The Privy Council effectively held 
that in order to fall within subsection 92(9), provincial legislation has to have been 
enacted for the purpose of raising revenue. If that is how subsection 92(9) has been 
understood, would subsection 92(2) not also be understood this way? 
 There is also the decision of the Privy Council in Reference Re Alberta Bills,101 
which struck down a tax that the Social Credit government of Alberta imposed on 
banks shortly after it came to power in the mid-1930s. In the Privy Council’s view, 
the real purpose of the tax was not to raise revenue from banks, but to eliminate them 
from Alberta, and the legislation imposing the tax was therefore, in pith and 
substance, banking legislation rather than taxation legislation. The clear implication 
of Alberta Bank Taxation Reference is that even if a provincial tax does raise 
additional revenues, that tax will not be sustained under subsection 92(2) if it relates 
to a matter falling within a head of power in section 91. This reasoning also suggests 
that the phrase “in order to the raising of a Revenue” imposes a substantive 
requirement: only if the real purpose of the tax is to raise revenue will it qualify under 
subsection 92(2).  
 In spite of these arguments for limiting the scope of subsection 92(2), we believe 
it unlikely that a provincial carbon tax would be struck down on the grounds that it is 
not “in order to the raising of a Revenue for Provincial Purposes.” While Russell gave 
substantive content to the “raising of a revenue” language in subsection 92(9), the 
practical consequence of that interpretation was simply that legislation regulating (or 
prohibiting) the retail trade in liquor could not be anchored in that particular head of 
power. It did not mean that the provincial legislatures were barred from enacting such 
legislation. In fact, in Hodge v. R., decided within a year of Russell, the Privy Council 
held that the provincial legislatures could regulate the retail trade in liquor under the 
combination of subsections 92(8), 92(15), and 92(16).102 In the Local Prohibition 
 
100 (1882), 7 A.C. 829 at 837, 8 C.R.A.C. 502 [Russell]. See also Ontario (A.G.) v. Canada (A.G.), 
[1896] A.C 348 (P.C.) [Local Prohibition Reference] (in which the Privy Council relied on its prior 
holding relating to s. 92(9) in Russell).  
101 Alberta (A.G.) v. Canada (A.G.) (1938), [1939] A.C. 117, (sub nom. Reference Re Alberta Bills) 
[1938] 4 D.L.R. 433 (P.C.) [Alberta Bank Taxation Reference]. The decision in this case has been 
considered in at least two other cases, but in neither of these cases did it form the basis of the decision: 
C.P.R. v. Saskatchewan (A.G.), [1951] 2 W.W.R. (N.S.) 424, 4 D.L.R. 21 (C.A.), aff’d [1952] S.C.R. 
231; Cosyns v. Canada (A.G.) (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 641, 88 D.L.R. (4th) 507 (Div. Ct.). 
102 (1883), 9 A.C. 117. 
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Reference, decided in 1896, the Privy Council also held that the provinces could 
prohibit that trade under either subsection 92(13) or subsection 92(16).103  
 Perhaps most importantly, it is factually untrue that a provincial carbon tax does 
not raise revenue. It clearly does raise revenue. The province has simply chosen to 
raise revenue in a different manner than it did previously. It would seem meddlesome 
to hold that a province that chose to raise revenues by taxing carbon instead of 
income could not make that change. Moreover, if revenue neutrality is 
constitutionally troublesome, how revenue neutral would a tax have to be to fall afoul 
of that rule? And how could the courts be sure that a particular tax would in fact be 
revenue neutral? A revenue-neutral carbon tax, which shifts taxation from income 
taxes to another source, may reflect a different method of revenue raising, but it 
indisputably raises revenues.  
 In the result, then, it is our opinion that provincially created carbon taxes would 
be held to fall within the scope of subsection 92(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867, and 
would therefore be upheld as valid. 
2. Cap-and-Trade and Intensity-Based Trading Regimes 
 The validity of a provincially created cap-and-trade or intensity-based trading 
regime would depend to a very considerable degree on the form it took, with the 
controlling factor being the entities to which the regime applied. If the regime were 
limited to business undertakings that the provincial legislatures have the authority to 
regulate qua businesses under any or all of subsections 92(5),104 92(10),105 92(13),106 
and 92A,107 there is good reason to believe that it would be upheld as valid. If, 
 
103 Supra note 100. 
104 “The Management and Sale of the Public Lands belonging to the Province and of the Timber and 
Wood thereon” (Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 1). 
105 This section reads:  
Local Works and Undertakings other than such as are of the following Classes:  
 (a)  Lines of Steam or other Ships, Railways, Canals, Telegraphs, and other Works 
and Undertakings connecting the Province with any other or others of the Provinces, 
or extending beyond the Limits of the Province;  
 (b)   Lines of Steam Ships between the Province and any British or Foreign Country;  
 (c)  Such Works as, although wholly situate within the Province, are before or after 
their Execution declared by the Parliament of Canada to be for the general Advantage 
of Canada or for the Advantage of Two or more of the Provinces (ibid.). 
106 “Property and Civil Rights in the Province” (ibid.). 
107 This head of power, which was added to the list of provincial powers by the Constitution Act, 
1982 (being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11), is not being reproduced verbatim 
because it is a very lengthy one with numerous subsections. For our purposes, what is significant 
about it is that it grants to the provincial legislatures power over the development and management of 
non-renewable natural resources, forestry resources and electrical energy (ibid.). 
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however, it were not so limited, but were made applicable to business undertakings 
that fall within federal legislative jurisdiction, there is good reason to believe that the 
courts would hold the regime to be invalid, at least in its application to those 
undertakings.  
 It is trite law that the power to regulate business activities in Canada resides 
presumptively with the provincial legislatures under subsection 92(13) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867, which grants those legislatures exclusive jurisdiction in 
respect of “Property and Civil Rights in the Province.” The theory underlying the 
inclusion of business activities within subsection 92(13) can be traced back to early 
decisions of the Privy Council, which held that the freedom to engage in the business 
activity of one’s choice (and to engage in that activity in the manner of one’s choice) 
is a “civil right.”108 Hence, legislation that in any way restricts that freedom—which 
all regulation of business activities through licensing and other regimes does to some 
extent—is presumptively legislation in relation to “civil rights”. That presumption is, 
however, a rebuttable one, and it will be overcome by constitutional grants of 
legislative authority to Parliament over the business activities of particular industries. 
Hence, it is clear that Parliament has jurisdiction to regulate the business activities of 
postal services (subsection 91(5)), shipping companies (subsection 91(10)), those 
engaged in seacoast and inland fisheries (subsection 91(12)), banks (subsection 
91(15)), savings banks (subsection 91(16)), and interprovincial transportation and 
communication undertakings (subsections 92(10) and 91(29)). As a result of judicial 
decisions defining the scope of Parliament’s POGG power, it is now also clear that 
Parliament has jurisdiction to regulate the business activities of those involved in the 
aeronautics109 and nuclear power generation110 industries. And, as a result of judicial 
decisions defining the scope of subsection 91(2), it is clear that Parliament has 
jurisdiction to regulate international and interprovincial trade, as well as to legislate in 
respect of “[general] trade affecting the whole Dominion,”111 a carefully 
circumscribed source of power pursuant to which Parliament has been able to 
legislate in the areas of competition policy112 and trademarks.113 
 
108 See the Insurance Reference, in which Lord Haldane spoke of the federal legislation there at 
issue, which regulated large insurance companies, as “... depriv[ing] private individuals of their liberty 
to carry on the business of insurance” (supra note 82 at 595). Later in his judgment, he stated that “it 
must now be taken that the authority to legislate for the regulation of trade and commerce [in s. 91(2)] 
does not extend to the regulation by a licensing system of a particular trade in which Canadians would 
otherwise be free to engage in the provinces” (ibid. at 596). 
109 Johannesson v. West St. Paul (Rural Municipality) (1951), [1952] 1 S.C.R. 292, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 
609. 
110 Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 327, 107 D.L.R. (4th) 457. 
111 Citizens Insurance Co. of Canada v. Parsons (1881), 7 A.C. 96 at 113, 8 C.R.A.C. 406 [Parsons].  
112 General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641, 68 O.R. (2d) 512 
[City National Leasing cited to S.C.R.]. 
113 Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings, 2005 SCC 65, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 302, 259 D.L.R. (4th) 577 [Kirkbi]. 
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 The industries that fall within provincial jurisdiction under this arrangement are 
numerous, and include many of the industries that emit large amounts of carbon into 
the atmosphere and are therefore good candidates for a cap-and-trade or intensity-
based trading regime, such as oil and gas, manufacturing, mining, forestry, 
construction, and intraprovincial truck and bus lines. Moreover, the power of the 
provincial legislatures to regulate the business activities of those industries has been 
understood broadly by the courts. In particular, that power has been held to permit the 
regulation of those activities for a range of different purposes: to protect consumers 
from fraudulent dealings; to protect the health and safety of consumers; to establish 
quality standards; to ensure adequate supply; and to protect the economic and other 
interests of employees.114 It has also been held to permit their regulation for the 
purpose of protecting the environment.115 There is every reason to believe, therefore, 
that provincial legislation establishing a cap-and-trade or intensity-based trading 
regime that is limited in its scope to such undertakings would be upheld as valid.  
 Would it be open to a provincial legislature to extend the reach of a cap-and-
trade or intensity-based trading regime to include industries that normally fall within 
federal legislative jurisdiction, such as aeronautics, international/interprovincial truck 
and bus lines, and nuclear power generation? Courts would likely analyze a 
constitutional attack on a provincial cap-and-trade program that explicitly includes 
one or more such industries by reference to the necessarily incidental doctrine. The 
current understanding of that doctrine requires consideration of three distinct 
questions: To what extent does the impugned part of the statute—here, the inclusion 
in the list of industries to which the cap-and-trade regime applies of the federally 
regulated industry in question—encroach on the legislative jurisdiction of the federal 
order of government when that part is viewed in isolation? Is the rest of the statute 
valid? Given the answer to the first question, is the impugned part sufficiently 
integrated into the rest of the statute to profit from that overall validity and thus be 
considered valid itself?116 
 The answer to the first of these questions would likely be that provincial 
legislation imposing legally enforceable constraints on the carbon emissions of a 
federally regulated industry is a very serious encroachment on federal legislative 
jurisdiction over that industry. In fact, there is good reason to believe that the courts 
would view such provincial action as an incursion into the core, or “basic, minimum 
and unassailable content,”117 of federal legislative jurisdiction over the industry. That 
 
114 The relevant jurisprudence is discussed in Hogg (Constitutional Law, supra note 82, c. 21, 
especially at 21.5-21.13). 
115 This interpretation of the power clearly seems implicit in the majority reasons of LaForest J. in 
Oldman River, particularly in his reference to the s. 92(10) provincial power over “local works and 
undertakings” (supra note 75 at 68). 
116 This current understanding is based on the decision in City National Leasing, supra note 112.  
117 That language comes from Beetz J.’s reasons in Bell Canada v. Quebec (Commission de la santé 
et de la sécurité du travail), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749 at 839, 51 D.L.R. (4th) 161 [Bell No. 2].  
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core has been defined in a series of cases dealing with the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity118 to include authority over labour relations and other 
important aspects of the management and operation of companies doing business 
within industries that fall under federal jurisdiction.119 That definition seems more 
than broad enough to capture control of operational matters as important as 
production processes. 
 It is also our view that, if the first question were to be answered in that manner, 
the courts would hold that the inclusion of a federally regulated industry in the list of 
industries to which the regime applied is unconstitutional. There are no cases 
involving the necessarily incidental doctrine in which the Supreme Court of Canada, 
in answering the first question, has found the degree of encroachment to be so great 
as to extend to a core area of federal (or provincial) legislative jurisdiction. Yet it is 
difficult to see how, if a court were presented with such a case, it could do anything 
other than strike down the impugned part of the statute. If, as the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity requires, valid, generally worded provincial legislation 
cannot constitutionally be applied in contexts in which such application would extend 
the reach of that legislation into a core area of federal legislation,120 it cannot be open 
to provincial legislatures to include such contexts in a list of contexts to which their 
legislation is to apply. Regardless of how closely integrated into the rest of the (valid) 
statute the impugned part might be, the fact that the impugned part encroached on a 
core area of federal jurisdiction should render it invalid.  
 As noted above, the cap-and-trade regime proposed by the Legislature of British 
Columbia may be integrated into a regionally defined cap-and-trade system that will 
include at least one other Canadian province (Manitoba) and several of the states in 
the western United States. Would the fact that the regime has this kind of regional 
character render it constitutionally suspect in the eyes of the courts? We do not 
believe that it would. While it is true, as noted above, that the regulation of 
international and interprovincial trade falls within exclusive federal legislative 
jurisdiction under subsection 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867,121 a regime of this 
nature merely makes it possible for the undertakings governed by the British 
Columbia statute to engage in the interprovincial and international trading of 
emission allowances if they believe that it is in their interests to do so. The regime is 
 
118 For a discussion of this constitutional doctrine, see generally Hogg, Constitutional Law, supra 
note 82, c. 15(8). 
119 See Commission du Salaire Minimum v. Bell Telephone Co. of Canada, [1966] S.C.R. 767, 59 
D.L.R. (2d) 145; Bell No. 2, supra note 117. 
120 For the Supreme Court of Canada’s most recent applications of this doctrine, see Canadian 
Western Bank v. Alberta, 2007 SCC 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, 409 A.R. 207; British Columbia (A.G.) v. 
Lafarge Canada, 2007 SCC 23, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 86, 281 D.L.R. (4th) 54. 
121 Parsons, supra note 111. 
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not directed at the regulation of such trading, as it would have to be in order to be 
vulnerable to attack under subsection 91(2).122 
3. Command-and-Control Regimes 
 The ability of provincial legislatures to regulate greenhouse gas emissions on the 
basis of a command-and-control approach turns on the same considerations as their 
ability to do so through the enactment of cap-and-trade or intensity-based trading 
regimes. If the legislation’s reach is limited to industries that fall within provincial 
legislative jurisdiction, it will likely be valid. If, by contrast, the legislation also 
applies to industries that fall within federal jurisdiction, it will be vulnerable to attack, 
at least insofar as its extension to those industries is concerned. 
B. Federal Jurisdiction 
 In this part, we explore the question of whether it is open to Parliament to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions through the mechanisms of: (1) a carbon tax; (2) a 
cap-and-trade or intensity-based trading regime; (3) a command-and-control regime; 
and (4) the CEA Act. 
1. A Carbon Tax 
 Unlike the provincial legislatures, Parliament has a very broad power to levy 
taxes. Subsection 91(3) of the Constitution Act, 1867 authorizes it to legislate in 
relation to “The raising of Money by any Mode or System of Taxation.” There is no 
limit on the kinds of taxes Parliament can create under this grant of authority, nor is 
there any territorial limit. The only requirements are that the legislation entail taxation 
and that it raise money.  
 Although other bases of jurisdiction for a federal carbon tax have been 
suggested,123 we are confident that federal legislation creating a carbon tax of the kind 
described above would be upheld under subsection 91(3). Such legislation would 
both entail taxation and raise money. If the tax were made revenue neutral, as was the 
tax proposed by the Liberals, it would be open to opponents of the tax to challenge its 
validity on the ground that it did not “raise money.” We do not think that such a 
challenge would succeed, however, and for the same reasons we do not believe that a 
provincially created revenue-neutral carbon tax would be vulnerable to attack on such 
a ground.124 
 
122 See Carnation Co. Ltd. v. Quebec (Agricultural Marketing Board), [1968] S.C.R. 238; Manitoba 
(A.G.) v. Manitoba Egg and Poultry Association, [1971] S.C.R. 689, 19 D.L.R. (3d) 169. 
123 See e.g. Chalifour, supra note 74 (arguing that the criminal law, trade and commerce, and POGG 
powers are tenable bases for federal jurisdiction). 
124 See Part II.A.1, above. 
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2. A Cap-and-Trade or Intensity-Based Trading Regime 
 In our analysis of the constitutionality of provincially created cap-and-
trade and/or intensity-based trading regimes, we argued that such regimes should pass 
constitutional muster, provided they are limited in their scope to industries whose 
business activities fall within provincial legislative jurisdiction, such as oil and gas, 
mining, manufacturing, construction, forestry, and intraprovincial truck and bus lines. 
It follows that a federal cap-and-trade or intensity-based trading regime would also 
pass constitutional muster if it were limited in scope to industries whose business 
activities fall within federal legislative jurisdiction, such as aeronautics, nuclear 
power generation, and international/interprovincial truck and bus lines. The more 
interesting and difficult question is whether a federal cap-and-trade or intensity-based 
trading regime like the plan announced by the Conservative government in 2007, 
which reached beyond those industries and brought provincially regulated industries 
such as oil and gas, construction, and manufacturing into its regulatory fold, would 
survive an attack on federalism grounds. It is to that question that the following 
analysis is devoted. 
 In our view, the federal government could reasonably seek to justify such 
legislation on one or more of the following bases: the criminal law power (subsection 
91(27)); the national concern branch of POGG; and the national emergency branch of 
POGG. Although others have made arguments that a cap-and-trade or emissions-
intensity program could be justified under the trade and commerce power (subsection 
91(2)),125 we do not believe that these types of programs can be sustained under this 
head of power. At bottom, it seems that the trade and commerce power is intended to 
vest the federal government with jurisdiction over economic matters.126 This is 
especially true with respect to the second branch of that head of power, the “general” 
trade and commerce branch. The leading case on that branch, City National Leasing, 
uses the word “economic” repeatedly.127 If City National Leasing were not limited to 
economic cases, there would be little to distinguish the trade and commerce power 
from the national concern branch of the POGG provision.128 While Professor Elgie 
has argued that emissions trading serves an economic purpose by seeking to 
concentrate compliance costs among those that can reduce emissions at the lowest 
cost, there is no denying that both cap-and-trade programs and emissions-intensity 
programs have an environmental objective as their core purpose. 
 
125 See e.g. Elgie, supra note 92; Castrilli, supra note 73. 
126 For a discussion of the jurisprudence relating to this branch of s. 91(2), see generally Hogg, 
Constitutional Law, supra note 82, c. 20.2. 
127 The test for the second branch can be found in City National Leasing (supra note 112 at 674, 
676). The Court held in that case that the federal Combines Investigation Act (R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23) 
satisfied that test and upheld its provisions on that ground. That test was recently affirmed by the 
Court in Kirkbi (supra note 113 (upholding provisions of the federal Trade-marks Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. 
T-13) on that ground)). 
128 Barton, supra note 73 at 445. 
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 We now consider three other defensible bases of federal jurisdiction. 
a. Criminal Law 
 On the face of it, the highly regulatory character of a cap-and-trade or intensity-
based trading regime would appear to preclude it from being upheld as criminal law, 
even if it contained the requisite offence-creating provisions. The Privy Council made 
it clear that federal legislation will not qualify as criminal law merely because it 
contains offence-creating provisions.129 Criminal law, the Privy Council told us, is 
about prohibiting socially harmful conduct, not regulating it. This understanding of 
the role of criminal law, and hence of the reach of subsection 91(27), came to be 
reflected in the test that the Supreme Court of Canada eventually established for 
subsection 91(27), which imposes three requirements: First, the legislation must be 
prohibitory. Second, it must provide a penalty for those who violate the prohibition. 
Third, it must have been enacted for “a public purpose which can support it as being 
in relation to criminal law,” such as “[p]ublic peace, order, security, health, [and] 
morality.”130  
 In Hydro-Québec, the Court upheld the toxic substances provisions of the CEP 
Act by a narrow five-to-four margin on the basis of subsection 91(27).131 It did so in 
spite of the highly regulatory character of those provisions. Why the Court was 
prepared to uphold the provisions on this basis is not entirely clear from the judgment 
itself, but a number of reasons suggest themselves. One is the fact that, as noted by 
Justice LaForest in his majority reasons, environmental protection does not lend itself 
to the creation of broadly defined prohibitions. As he put it: “Having regard to the 
particular nature and requirements of effective environmental protection legislation, I 
do not share my colleagues’ concern that the prohibition [against releasing a toxic 
substance without a permit or in contravention of an interim ministerial order] 
originates in a regulation.”132 Another reason is the importance the majority attached 
to protecting the environment. “[S]tewardship of the environment” was said to be “a 
major challenge of our time”, “an international problem, one that requires action by 
governments at all levels”, and “a fundamental value of our society.”133 And a third 
reason is the fact that, by upholding the impugned provisions under subsection 91(27) 
instead of under the national concern branch of POGG, the Court avoided assigning 
the federal order of government exclusive jurisdiction over the release of toxic 
 
129 See Board of Commerce Reference, supra note 82; Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, 
[1925] A.C. 396, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 5. 
130 Margarine Reference, supra note 89 at 50. 
131 Supra note 77. It should be noted that the 2005 Liberal Plan explicitly relied upon s. 91(27). 
132 Ibid. at para. 147. 
133 Ibid. at para. 127. 
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substances into the environment.134 As Justice LaForest put it, “the Constitution 
should be so interpreted as to afford both levels of government ample means to 
protect the environment while maintaining the general structure of the Constitution. 
This is hardly consistent with an enthusiastic adoption of the ‘national dimensions’ 
doctrine.”135 
 If these were the reasons the majority upheld the CEP Act’s toxic substances 
provisions under subsection 91(27) in Hydro-Québec, then they could all be invoked 
in support of upholding a federal cap-and-trade or intensity-based trading regime 
under that head of power as well. But would they be viewed as strong enough reasons 
to do so? We are doubtful. Although the problem of climate change is immediate and 
extremely serious, the emission of CO2 does not have the same directness of harm as 
the emission of more lethal substances, such as the polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) 
at issue in Hydro-Québec, which seem more worthy of criminal prohibition. Also, a 
cap-and-trade or intensity-based trading regime permits companies to buy and sell the 
right to cause the very environmental harm that the regime aims to control. Finally, it 
would be difficult, as a matter of both logic and principle, for the courts to label a 
federal cap-and-trade or intensity-based trading regime “prohibitory” (as they would 
have to do to uphold it on the basis of subsection 91(27)) while simultaneously 
labelling very similar provincial regimes as “regulatory” (which they would have to 
do in order to uphold those regimes on the basis of subsections 92(5), 92(10), 92(13), 
and 92A).  
 We are well aware that a number of scholarly comments support the use of the 
criminal law head of power for greenhouse gas regulations.136 We are also aware that 
the CEP Act provision currently used to regulate CO2 emissions is the same one that 
was upheld in Hydro-Québec.137 However, the fact that this provision was upheld in 
the context of PCBs and other substances that are truly toxic (or, in Justice LaForest’s 
 
134 It is the position of the Court that if federal legislation is upheld under the national concern 
branch of POGG, the “matter” of that legislation is foreclosed to the provincial legislatures. See Crown 
Zellerbach, supra note 77 at 433. 
135 Hydro-Québec, supra note 77 at para. 116. 
136 See e.g. Peter W. Hogg, A Question of Parliamentary Power: Criminal Law and the Control of 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Backgrounder, No. 114 (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 2008); Bankes & 
Lucas, supra note 73; Elgie, supra note 92; Chalifour, supra note 74; Barton, supra note 73. 
137 At issue in Hydro-Québec was s. 11 of the CEP Act. This provision was virtually identical to 
what is now s. 64 of the CEP Act (supra note 10), which provides:  
[A] substance is toxic if it is entering or may enter the environment in a quantity or 
concentration or under conditions that 
 (a)   have or may have an immediate or long-term harmful effect on the environment 
or its biological diversity; 
 (b)  constitute or may constitute a danger to the environment on which human life 
depends; or  
 (c)   constitute or may constitute a danger in Canada to human life or health. 
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words, “poisonous”138) does not mean that the federal government has a free hand to 
bring within its reach any and all substances it considers to be harmful to the 
environment. If it were open to the federal government to do that, there would be no 
limit to Parliament’s jurisdiction over the environment. By the same token, the 
implication of upholding a cap-and-trade or intensity-based trading program under 
subsection 91(27) is that there would be little if any practical significance left in the 
requirement that federal legislation be “prohibitory” in character in order to qualify as 
“criminal law”; and, as a consequence, there would be very little in the way of 
meaningful limits on the scope of federal jurisdiction under subsection 91(27).  
b. The National Concern Branch of POGG 
 Parliament’s power to legislate for the “Peace, Order and Good Government of 
Canada” is currently understood to have three distinct branches: (1) the national 
emergency branch; (2) the national concern branch; and (3) the gap branch.139 The 
gap branch of POGG captures “matters” over which the Parliament of Canada has 
authority to legislate because they cannot plausibly be assigned to any of the 
enumerated classes of subject in sections 91 to 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867. 
There are in fact very few such matters, and they would certainly not involve the 
protection of the environment. Our focus is therefore on the first two branches of 
POGG. 
 The origins of the national concern branch lie in Lord Watson’s reasons for 
judgment in the Local Prohibition Reference; in particular, in the following passage: 
[T]he exercise of legislative power by the Parliament of Canada, in regard to all 
matters not enumerated in s. 91, ought to be strictly confined to such matters as 
are unquestionably of Canadian interest and importance, and ought not to 
trench upon provincial legislation with respect to any of the classes of subjects 
enumerated in s. 92. To attach any other construction to the general power 
which, in supplement of its enumerated powers, is conferred upon the 
Parliament of Canada by s. 91, would, in their Lordships’ opinion, not only be 
contrary to the intendment of the Act, but would practically destroy the 
autonomy of the provinces.140 
 This passage makes it clear that, unlike the gap branch of POGG, the national 
concern branch provides Parliament with the authority to legislate in relation to 
“matters” that do have a connection with one or more of the classes of subjects 
assigned to the provincial legislatures. The passage also makes it clear, however, that 
in the view of the Privy Council, the courts should be loath to uphold such legislation. 
Only in relation to “such matters as are unquestionably of Canadian interest and 
 
138 Hydro-Québec, supra note 77 at para. 141. 
139 This understanding is reflected in Professor Hogg’s discussion of POGG (Constitutional Law, 
supra note 82, c. 17). 
140 Supra note 100 at 360-61. 
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importance” should they be willing to do so;141 otherwise, the interest in protecting 
provincial autonomy should hold sway.  
 The current understanding of the national concern doctrine reflects a similar 
reluctance to permit Parliament to make frequent use of this branch of POGG. This 
understanding stipulates that  
[f]or a matter to qualify as a matter of national concern ... it must have a 
singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly distinguishes it from 
matters of provincial concern and a scale of impact on provincial jurisdiction 
that is reconcilable with the fundamental distribution of legislative power under 
the Constitution.142  
The current understanding also suggests that a relevant consideration in making such 
an assessment is “the effect on extra-provincial interests of a provincial failure to deal 
effectively with the control or regulation of the intra-provincial aspects of the 
matter.”143 The implication of this suggestion is that only when the courts are satisfied 
that such a “provincial failure” would have significant harmful effects on extra-
provincial interests should they be willing to hold that a matter is truly of national 
concern. 
 Another important feature of the current understanding of the national concern 
branch is that the consequence of the courts holding that a particular matter is a 
matter of national concern, is to render that matter one within exclusive federal 
jurisdiction. That matter, “including its intra-provincial aspects”, is removed in its 
entirety from provincial legislative jurisdiction.144 This feature of the doctrine can 
only add to the courts’ reluctance to use the national concern branch as a basis for 
upholding federal legislation, particularly in relation to social and economic issues in 
which the provinces can be said to have a strong and legitimate interest.145 
 Could the federal government successfully demonstrate that a cap-and-
trade or intensity-based trading regime of the kind we are considering should be 
upheld under POGG on the basis that it dealt with a matter of national concern? The 
answer to that question would depend at least in part on how the “matter” of such a 
regime was formulated. Some formulations might serve, at least superficially, to 
distinguish the subject matter of the regime from matters of provincial concern. But 
there are clearly limits to how creative one can be in the drafting exercise. Bearing 
these considerations in mind, we presume that the matter would be formulated in 
 
141 Ibid. 
142 Crown Zellerbach, supra note 77 at 432. 
143 Ibid. 
144 LeDain J., speaking on behalf of the majority in Crown Zellerbach, put this feature of the current 
understanding in the following terms: “where a matter falls within the national concern doctrine ... as 
distinct from the emergency doctrine, Parliament has an exclusive jurisdiction of a plenary nature to 
legislate in relation to that matter, including its intra-provincial aspects” (ibid. at 433). 
145 For an excellent example of this occurring, see the majority reasons of LaForest J. in Hydro-
Québec (supra note 77). 
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terms of something like “protecting against the harmful effects of global warming by 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions on the part of Canadian industry.”  
 There are some factors that would support a finding that the regulation of 
greenhouse gases by a cap-and-trade or intensity-based program constitutes a matter 
of national concern.146 The fact that the federal legislation would have been enacted in 
furtherance of Canada’s obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, and would deal with a 
matter of “predominantly extra-provincial character and implications,” would likely 
count in favour of such a finding. The harmful extra-provincial effects that would 
flow from the failure of provincial governments to regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
effectively would also support that finding.  
 On the other side of the ledger is the fact that the “matter” of this kind of regime 
could be said to lack the required “singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that 
clearly distinguishes it from matters of provincial concern.”147 Courts could well find 
that this matter is not single or indivisible at all, but simply a combination of a federal 
matter (the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions by federally regulated 
undertakings) and a provincial matter (the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions by 
provincially regulated undertakings). Furthermore, the courts would almost certainly 
view “the scale of impact on provincial jurisdiction”148 inherent in allowing 
Parliament to enact a comprehensive cap-and-trade regime for the entire country as 
extremely serious, particularly for provinces like Alberta. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, there is the fact that, if the courts were to uphold such a regime on the 
basis of the national concern doctrine, provincial legislatures would be precluded 
from regulating greenhouse gas emissions produced by industries such as oil and gas, 
manufacturing, and construction. Canadian courts would not look at all favourably 
upon such a consequence. On balance, we do not believe that the national concern 
branch of POGG would sustain a federal cap-and-trade or intensity-based program. 
c. The National Emergency Branch of POGG 
 The national emergency branch of POGG has its origins in the judgments of Lord 
Haldane, written in the early part of the twentieth century. Lord Haldane believed 
strongly in the need to restrict the scope of federal legislative jurisdiction in order to 
protect provincial autonomy, and that belief led him to construe the POGG power 
even more narrowly than had Lord Watson in the Local Prohibition Reference.149 It 
was Lord Haldane’s position that Parliament could only make use of POGG in 
“exceptional” circumstances such as “war or famine”, when the Dominion as a whole 
was truly “imperilled” and legislative intervention by the federal order of government 
 
146 Rolfe, supra note 73 at 351; Barton, supra note 73 at 431. Both authors conclude that the 
national concern branch of POGG could sustain such a federal regime. 
147 Crown Zellerbach, supra note 77 at 432. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Supra note 100. 
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was required to save it from disaster.150 That position was rejected in subsequent 
cases,151 but the notion that Parliament should be able to legislate in times of national 
emergency has remained part of the law and has given rise to what we now refer to as 
the national emergency branch of POGG.  
 The jurisprudence relating to this branch of POGG, in particular the decision of 
the Supreme Court of Canada in the Anti-Inflation Reference,152 has generated a body 
of doctrine on which the courts would be expected to rely if the federal government 
sought to invoke the national emergency branch in support of a comprehensive cap-
and-trade or intensity-based trading regime. In our view, that body of doctrine can be 
summarized as follows: (1) the federal government can rely on the emergency branch 
both to respond to existing emergencies and to prevent new emergencies from 
arising;153 (2) emergencies for this purpose are not limited to those identified by Lord 
Haldane in his judgments, but can include economic emergencies such as a high rate 
of inflation;154 (3) the courts should be loath to second-guess a decision by the federal 
government that an emergency exists or is threatened, and need only be satisfied that 
the government had a rational basis for making such a decision;155 (4) the emergency 
branch can only be invoked to sustain legislation of temporary duration;156 (5) the 
legislation should indicate, in a preamble or otherwise, that it has been enacted for the 
purpose of dealing with at least “a serious national condition”,157 if not a national 
emergency; and (6) unlike in the case of the national concern branch, upholding 
federal legislation on the basis of the national emergency branch does not preclude 
the provincial legislatures from legislating in their own ways to deal with the 
emergency in question (assuming they can do so in a manner that respects the limits 
on provincial legislative authority under section 92).158 
 In our view, there is reason to believe that courts applying this body of doctrine 
could well uphold a comprehensive federal cap-and-trade regime under the 
emergency branch of POGG. The fact that the jurisprudence permits Parliament to act 
 
150 Board of Commerce Reference, supra note 82 at 200. 
151 An important decision in this regard was that of the Privy Council in Ontario (A.G.) v. Canada 
Temperance Federation, [1946] A.C. 193, [1946] 2 D.L.R. 1 (P.C.) [Temperance Federation cited to 
A.C.]. 
152 Supra note 87.  
153 Ibid. See also Temperance Federation, supra note 151. 
154 Anti-Inflation Reference, ibid. 
155 Ibid. See also Fort Frances Pulp and Paper v. Manitoba Free Press, [1923] A.C. 695, [1923] 3 
D.L.R. 629 (P.C.). 
156 Anti-Inflation Reference, ibid. See also Canada (A.G.) v. Ontario (A.G.), [1937] A.C. 355 (P.C.) 
[Employment and Social Insurance Reference]; Temperance Federation, supra note 151.  
157 This can be said to be implicit in the reasons for judgment of the majority in the Anti-Inflation 
Reference, from which these words were taken (ibid. at 422). Beetz J., in his dissenting reasons, took 
the position that the indication that Parliament was relying on the emergency branch in support of the 
impugned legislation had to be “unmistakable” (at 463), a standard that in his view had not been met 
in that case. 
158 See LeDain J.’s reasons for judgment in Crown Zellerbach (supra note 77 at 432).  
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in anticipation of a new emergency arising would serve federal interests in a very 
direct way. Moreover, there seems little reason to doubt that an environmental 
disaster of the kind that global climate change portends would be held to qualify as an 
emergency for this purpose. The posture of judicial restraint that the doctrine calls for 
in evaluating the need for legislative action would also serve federal interests well. 
The requirement of temporary duration is one that can be met by careful drafting, as 
can the need for appropriate signalling. Finally, the fact that upholding such a regime 
on the basis of this branch would leave it open to the provincial legislatures to take 
whatever steps they consider advisable to reduce greenhouse gas emissions would 
make it a much more attractive option to the courts than the national concern branch. 
 As the reader will have noted, the previous paragraph referred only to a cap-and-
trade regime and not to an intensity-based trading regime. The omission of the latter 
was deliberate. Even with a posture of judicial restraint, we think it unlikely that the 
courts would consider an intensity-based trading regime, which would permit 
greenhouse gas emissions to increase over time, to constitute a genuine attempt by 
Parliament to respond to a pending national disaster. It is only the cap-and-trade 
option that, in our view, could plausibly be defended on the basis of the national 
emergency branch of POGG. 
 Any suggestion that the federal government was considering the use of the 
emergency branch would undoubtedly result in strong opposition from the provincial 
governments, who would portray such an initiative as a direct and profound assault 
on their ability to devise and implement policies tailored to their respective 
economies and populations. However, the federal government could reduce the sting 
of that opposition by making it clear that it would only pursue such an initiative if the 
provincial legislatures did not take what it considered to be strong enough action over 
the course of a prescribed time period. The federal government could also draft its 
legislation in such a way as to make its implementation contingent on that condition 
being met.  
3. A Command-and-Control Regime 
 Parliament’s ability to enact a command-and-control regime under section 91 
would turn on the same considerations as its ability to enact a cap-and-trade regime. 
If the scope of a federal command-and-control regime were limited to industries 
whose business activities fall within federal legislative jurisdiction, it would almost 
certainly be valid. Its validity would only be open to attack if its reach extended into 
the provincial sphere—oil and gas, manufacturing, construction, and so on.  
 Such an extended command-and-control regime could plausibly be defended on 
the same bases as an extended cap-and-trade or intensity-based trading regime: 
subsection 91(27); the national concern branch of POGG; and the national emergency 
branch of POGG. In our view, the analysis we provided above with respect to the viability 
of the latter two sources of jurisdiction in the context of a federal cap-and-
trade or intensity-based trading regime are equally applicable in the context of a command- 
498 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL [Vol. 54 
 
 
and-control regime. Hence, we believe that such a regime would likely not be upheld 
under the national concern branch of POGG, but might well be upheld under the 
national emergency branch. Insofar as subsection 91(27) is concerned, our view is 
that, while the criminal law power may not sustain a cap-and-trade or intensity-based 
trading program, the more prescriptive nature of command-and-control regulation 
renders it more likely to be upheld as a valid exercise of federal power. Unlike a cap-
and-trade or intensity-based trading regime, a command-and-control regime does not 
permit the companies it governs to buy and sell the right to cause environmental 
harm.  
4. The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 
 The final regulatory option to be considered is the use of the CEA Act to require 
federal authorities to consider the greenhouse gas implications of new projects 
governed by that statute before approving them. It will be recalled that this statute 
calls for environmental assessments of projects that a federal authority is itself 
proposing, that a federal authority intends to support financially, that involve the sale 
or lease of federal lands, or that implicate an area of federal concern identified by 
regulation.159 It will also be recalled that, in making such assessments, review panels 
are required to consider “any change that the project may cause in the 
environment,”160 with “environment” understood as encompassing “air, including all 
layers of the atmosphere.”161 As we discuss below, the CEA Act presents an excellent 
opportunity to utilize an existing statute and existing institutions to bring 
consideration of greenhouse gas emissions into federal decision-making. 
 There is every reason to believe that, if challenged, this option would be upheld 
as constitutionally valid. In Oldman River, the Supreme Court of Canada made it 
clear that it is open to Parliament to require that the environmental implications of 
projects that engage areas of federal concern be considered before these projects are 
approved.162 The Court also held that, in assessing these implications, the reviewing 
bodies are entitled to take all of the projects’ possible environmental effects into 
account. In the course of his majority reasons for judgment in that case, Justice 
LaForest considered the example of a project involving the construction of a new 
interprovincial railway. In his view, a panel asked to assess the environmental 
implications of such a project would be entitled to take into account the impact of the 
new line on “ecologically sensitive habitats such as wetlands and forests”; potential 
hazards to “the health and safety of nearby communities if dangerous commodities 
are to be carried on the line”; and the possible “economic benefit to those 
communities through job creation and the multiplier effect that will have in the local 
 
159 CEA Act, supra note 9, s. 5(1). 
160 Ibid., s. 2(1), s.v. “environmental effect”, (a). 
161 Ibid., s. 2(1), s.v. “environment”. See also ibid., s. 16(1)-(2) (outlining what review panels are 
required to consider). 
162 Supra note 75.  
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economy.”163 In fact, he said, not permitting the panel to consider such matters 
“would lead to the most astonishing results, and it defies reason to assert that 
Parliament is constitutionally barred from weighing the broad environmental 
repercussions, including socio-economic concerns, when legislating with respect to 
decisions of this nature.”164  
 Was it important to Justice LaForest’s reasoning in this regard that interprovincial 
railways are federal undertakings under paragraph 92(10)(a) and therefore, qua 
undertakings, within exclusive federal jurisdiction? Would he have taken a more 
restrained view of the permissible scope of a federally mandated environmental 
assessment if the project in question had been one that fell prima facie within 
provincial jurisdiction (such as the dam at issue in Oldman River), with the federal 
interest being limited to the impact of that project on an area of federal jurisdiction 
(such as the navigability of the Oldman River)? We do not believe so.165 Justice 
LaForest did not draw any such distinction himself, as he could well have done given 
the nature of the case before him. Moreover, he referred with approval to an 
Australian case, Murphyores Incorporated Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, in 
which the High Court of Australia upheld the constitutionality of an inquiry, made 
pursuant to Commonwealth legislation, that assessed the environmental impact of the 
mining of particular substances by a company seeking permission to export those 
substances, even though the mining activity was acknowledged to be “predominantly 
a state interest.”166  
 We conclude, therefore, that it is open to the agencies of the federal government 
to include greenhouse gas emissions in the list of environmental concerns to be 
considered by panels constituted under the CEA Act.  
C. Summary 
 In summary, then, it is our view that both orders of government have a relatively 
broad array of options available to them under the constitution to deal with 
greenhouse gas emissions. The provincial legislatures can levy a carbon tax on 
consumers. They can also impose different kinds of regulatory regimes on the main 
industrial emitters of greenhouse gases within their respective boundaries, provided 
that those regimes are limited in their application to industries understood to fall 
within provincial legislative jurisdiction. Parliament, too, can levy a carbon tax as 
well as impose different kinds of regulatory regimes on industrial emitters. Its 
authority to create such regimes is clearest if the regimes are limited in scope to 
 
163 Ibid. at 66. 
164 Ibid. 
165 See Meinhard Doelle, The Federal Environmental Assessment Process: A Guide and Critique 
(Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis, 2008) at 67-71. Contra Steven A. Kennett, “Federal Environmental 
Jurisdiction After Oldman”, Case Comment, (1993) 38 McGill L.J. 180.  
166 [1976] HCA 20, 136 C.L.R. 1. 
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industries that are understood to fall within federal legislative jurisdiction. However, 
it is possible, given the extent and nature of the global climate change problem, that 
Parliament could regulate all industrial emitters using the national emergency branch 
of POGG. While some have argued that Parliament could regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions under the criminal law power, we have our doubts about this line of 
argument. Finally, it is open to the federal government to use the provisions of the 
CEA Act to assist in its efforts to control climate change.  
 Given the wide range of available options, the choices our governments make in 
this area will—or at least should—be based primarily on policy considerations. It is 
to those considerations that we now turn. 
III. The Policy Dimension 
 Apart from the constitutional considerations, there are sharp policy differences 
that render some options considerably better than others. Effectiveness in reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions is very much tied into the ease with which regulatory 
options can be incorporated into Canada’s regulatory infrastructure, and it is here that 
the options diverge. A discussion of the main regulatory options outlined in Part I.A 
follows.  
A. The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 
 In terms of climate change action, there is no lower-hanging fruit than the use of 
the CEA Act. The environmental assessment process is common throughout the 
world, and other countries have used it to challenge greenhouse gas–emitting projects 
or policies. In the United States, a number of cases have involved administrative 
decisions with greenhouse gas implications.167 All of these environmental assessment 
cases challenged agency findings that a project or policy would have “no significant 
impact” and therefore that no “environmental impact statement” was required under 
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.168 While the results have been mixed, 
no court has questioned the appropriateness of a fairly detailed evaluation of the 
greenhouse gas impacts of projects or administrative actions. In Australia, a similar 
cluster of cases involving the development of coal mines, in which plaintiffs sought 
to use the environmental assessment process to force consideration of greenhouse gas 
emissions.169 In New Zealand, a number of cases have arisen involving the failure to 
 
167 Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 912 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990), 
overruled in part by Florida Audubon Society v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Friends of the 
Earth v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp.2d 889 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Border Power Plant Working Group v. 
Department of Energy, 260 F. Supp.2d 997 (S.D. Cal. 2003); Natural Resources Defense Council v. 
Abraham, 355 F.3d 179 (2nd Cir. 2004). 
168 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 to 4370f. 
169 Australian Conservation Foundation v. Latrobe City Council, [2004] VCAT 2029, 140 
L.G.E.R.A. 100; Gray v. Minister for Planning, [2006] NSWLEC 720, 152 L.G.E.R.A. 258; Wildlife 
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consider net greenhouse gas effects in refusing applications for wind farms.170 The 
environmental assessment statutes in all of these countries are very similar to 
Canada’s CEA Act. 
 The idea of using environmental assessment to consider greenhouse gas effects is 
not new to Canada, but the practice has been spotty. A 2000 report sponsored by the 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (CEA Agency) concluded that “[t]he 
extent to which climate change was factored into each environmental assessment 
(EA) varies considerably” and that “a gap exists between climate change science and 
its application to the EA community.”171 
 The CEA Agency, in collaboration with with provincial and territorial agencies, 
has published a general guidance document for incorporating climate change into all 
environmental assessments, not just those under the CEA Act.172 Perhaps its genesis as 
a cross-jurisdictional and cooperative effort necessitates its modest and general scope: 
the document states that it is intended as “general guidance, to be considered at the 
discretion of jurisdictions and regulatory authorities”173 and that “[t]he consideration 
of climate change in environmental assessments is not intended to impose any 
mitigation obligations over and above the obligations that will be imposed through 
the implementation of the general climate change policies.”174 In any case, guidance 
documents published by the CEA Agency have received very little deference from 
agencies or courts.175  
 As a formal matter, then, there is little in the way of procedural or substantive 
requirements mandating the consideration of a project’s greenhouse gas effects in the 
environmental assessment process. This does not mean that greenhouse gas 
considerations are never taken into account under the CEA Act. In a joint review 
                                                                                                                                       
Preservation Society of Queensland v. Minister for the Environment and Heritage, [2006] FCA 736, 
232 A.L.R. 510. 
170 Genesis Power Ltd. v. Franklin District Council, [2005] NZRMA 541; Meridian Energy Ltd. v. 
Wellington City Council (2007), No. W31/07 (Environment Ct.); Environmental Defense Society v. 
Auckland Regional Council, [2002] 11 NZRMA 492; Environmental Defense Society v. Taranaki 
Regional Council (2002), No. A184/02 (Environment Ct.). 
171 Canadian Institute for Climate Studies, Climate Change and Environmental Assessment, Part 1: 
Review of Climate Change Considerations in Selected Past Environmental Assessments by Rick J. 
Lee (2000), online: Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency <http://www.acee-ceaa.gc.ca/015/ 
001/005/abstract_e htm>.  
172 Federal-Provincial-Territorial Committee on Climate Change and Environmental Assessment, 
Incorporating Climate Change Considerations in Environmental Assessment: General Guidance for 
Practitioners (2003), online: Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency <http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/ 
default.asp?lang=En&n=A41F45C5-1&toc=hide>.  
173 Ibid. at 1. 
174 Ibid. at 2-3. 
175 See e.g. Friends of the West Country Association v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans) 
(1999), [2000] 2 F.C. 263 at para. 22, 248 N.R. 25, Rothstein J. (“I do not find the independent utility 
principle or the portions of the Guide which may reflect the independent utility principle helpful for 
the purpose of interpreting subsection 15(3) of the CEAA”). 
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panel involving the National Energy Board (NEB), the panel undertook a very brief 
discussion of the greenhouse gas effects of the construction of a gas pipeline in 
British Columbia.176 The panel noted that the emissions were “minor in comparison to 
overall emissions on Vancouver Island” and that “[on] a global scale, any change in 
climate or the environment caused by GHG emissions from the Project could not be 
defined, measured or described.”177 The panel also complained that “at the present 
time, there are no defined criteria to measure significance in relation to GHG when 
considered in a environmental assessment ... Had there been detailed policies or 
regulations for targets in place, the Panel could have evaluated GHG emissions 
against these.”178 How, then, is a panel to meet its mandate, set out in sections 20 and 
37 of the CEA Act, to determine whether “the project is likely to cause significant 
adverse environmental effects” (SAEEs) as a result of greenhouse gas emissions? 
 In the absence of any federal or provincial guidance on how to evaluate the 
environmental effects of greenhouse gas emissions, the panel considered the project 
against the backdrop of federal and provincial initiatives to reduce greenhouse gases 
and assessed whether the pipeline would prejudice the ability of Canada to meet its 
Kyoto Protocol commitments. It concluded that it would not: “[N]ew natural gas 
pipeline and energy generation projects have been factored into the outlook. Because 
such developments have been incorporated in the outlook, the GSX project should 
not compromise Canada’s ability to reach our Kyoto target.”179 In other words, the 
panel concluded that the pipeline was consistent with the then-Liberal federal 
government plan for how Canada would meet its Kyoto Protocol commitment. The 
panel evaluated the significance of the environmental effects not by any empirical 
determination, but by evaluating whether the greenhouse gases were anticipated by 
governmental greenhouse gas reduction plans. 
 Concerning another project, in Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development v. 
Canada (A.G.), the Federal Court held that a joint review panel failed to adequately 
address the environmental effects of the greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the 
proposed Kearl Oil Sands Project, which would emit an average of 3.7 megatonnes of 
CO2 equivalents every year over its five-year life, accounting for about 0.5 per cent of 
Canada’s annual emissions and 1.7 per cent of Alberta’s annual emissions.180 The 
court held that the panel erred in not “explain[ing] in a general way why the potential 
environmental effects, either with or without the implementation of mitigation 
measures, will be insignificant”181 and in failing to provide a “clear and cogent 
 
176 Joint Review Panel Report: GSX Canada Pipeline Project (Calgary: National Energy Board, 
2003), online: Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency <http://www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/010/0001/ 
0001/0004/0002/report_e.pdf>.  
177 Ibid. at 57. 
178 Ibid. at 58. 
179 Letter From Environment Canada (February 2003) at 5, cited in ibid.  
180 2008 FC 302, 323 F.T.R. 297, 80 Admin L.R. (4th) 74. The reference year used in these 
calculations was 2002 (ibid. at para. 70).  
181 Ibid. at para. 73. 
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articulation of the reasons behind the Panel’s conclusion.”182 The court remitted the 
matter back to the panel for the sole purpose of stating the bases for its conclusion 
that the environmental impacts would be insignificant. 
 The panel responded, in an addendum, that “it must give [Alberta Environment]’s 
endorsement of the target significant weight in its consideration of the adverse 
environmental effects of the Project given [Alberta Environment]’s role as the 
provincial agency responsible for establishing, monitoring and enforcing emission 
standards.”183 Like the joint review panel that assessed the British Columbia gas 
pipeline, the Kearl Oil Sands Joint Panel looked to regulatory programs in place and 
decided that the project was in keeping with, or accounted for by, existing regulatory 
programs, essentially deferring to governmental agencies that are apparently working 
on the problem.  
 Given the legal void, these panels can be forgiven for struggling with the 
determination of the significance of a large, project-specific increase in greenhouse 
gas emissions. Making that determination by reference to a regulatory backdrop 
seems like a reasonable alternative to throwing up one’s hands and concluding that 
the greenhouse gas emissions of any single project will have no significant effect in 
the global context. However, joint review panels have no basis in law to rely on this 
backdrop. Under the CEA Act, the critical determination is whether a project is “likely 
to cause significant adverse environmental effects.”184 Such an inquiry must focus on 
the environmental effects themselves, not on whether the project is in keeping with a 
provincial or federal agency’s grand plan for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In 
fact, environmental assessment is in part meant to act as a check on agency discretion, 
bringing to light environmental information that would otherwise be embarrassing or 
unfavourable to project development.185 It is therefore paradoxical to use 
governmental policy as the reference point for determining what is an SAEE.  
 Lurking in the background is the much more difficult question of whether the 
CEA Act, as currently constituted, can address climate change at all. If, as we argue, 
the CEA Act does not permit a determination of environmental impact on the basis of 
a project’s consistency with legislation or with some governmental plan or policy, 
then can the CEA Act do anything to address climate change? The obvious problem is 
one that pervades every effort to address climate change: viewed on an incremental, 
project-by-project basis, even large projects are insignificant in the context of global 
greenhouse gas emissions. While the Kearl Oil Sands Project is unusually large in 
 
182 Ibid. at para. 78. 
183 Joint Panel Report, Kearl Oil Sands Project, Addendum to EUB Decision 2007-013, Additional 
Rationale for the Joint Review Panel’s Conclusion on Air Emissions (6 May 2008), online: Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Agency <http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/050/DocHTMLContainer_e.cfm?Document 
ID=26766>.  
184 Supra note 9, ss. 20(1), 37(1) (this standard is found in both sections). 
185 Bradley C. Karkkainen, “Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s 
Environmental Performance” (2002) 102 Colum. L. Rev. 903 at 904-905. 
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terms of greenhouse gas emissions, it would have represented a mere 0.04 per cent of 
the world’s CO2 emissions in 2006.186  
 The responsible answer to this more difficult question is, of course, that work 
must commence immediately on curbing greenhouse gas emissions, even if that work 
will not, by itself, make an immediate difference to climate change. The CEA Act, 
having been in place for over a decade and having acquired a body of jurisprudence, 
is an obvious mechanism for the regulation of greenhouse gases, at least in the 
context of federal projects. But because the current CEA Act standard of SAEEs is not 
useful in the climate change context, the terms of the CEA Act need amendment to 
specifically incorporate climate change concerns. Either a legislative amendment 
must adapt this phraseology to climate change, or, by regulation, the phrase must be 
defined in terms of what is permitted in the way of greenhouse gas emissions. 
 A legislative solution would appear to be the cleanest approach to adapting the 
CEA Act to climate change concerns. Companion sections paralleling sections 20 and 
37 of the CEA Act might provide for a separate process evaluating a project 
specifically for its greenhouse gas emissions. For example, a parallel section might 
require, in lieu of an SAEE, that any project subject to the CEA Act be “carbon 
neutral”187 or “have undertaken reasonable efforts to mitigate greenhouse gas 
emissions” or conform to some other standard reasonably susceptible of review by a 
panel. Standards such as these would shift the CEA Act regime into more of a 
substantive statute, calling for substantive outcomes. However, this would be a 
necessary consequence of providing agencies and reviewing courts with something 
more helpful than the concept of an SAEE. The most important move would still be 
to simply require some explicit consideration of greenhouse gas effects for projects 
subject to the CEA Act and to provide some guidance for panels and agencies 
reviewing projects in relation to such effects. 
 
186 The world’s CO2 emissions totalled 8230 megatonnes in 2006 (Gregg Marland, Bob Andres & 
Tom Boden, Global CO2 Emissions from Fossil-Fuel Burning, Cement Manufacture, and Gas 
Flaring: 1751-2006, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratories, 
(2009), online: Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center <http://cdiac.ornl.gov/ftp/ndp030/global. 
1751_2006.ems>). The Kearl Oil Sands Project was projected to produce 3.7 megatonnes of CO2 
emissions (Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development v. Canada (A.G.), supra note 180). Thus, 
the Kearl Oil Sands Project’s emissions would only have represented about 0.04 per cent of the 
world’s CO2 emissions in 2006.  
187 Carbon neutrality is a frequently used term indicating that the greenhouse gas emissions of a 
project or action will, by performing offsetting actions, mitigation actions, or both, ensure that the total 
greenhouse gas emissions after the completion of a project are lower than before. Offsetting actions 
might include planting trees to take up CO2 or capturing landfill gas (a powerful greenhouse gas) that 
would not have been captured otherwise. “Carbon neutral” was the New Oxford American 
Dictionary’s word of the year in 2006 (Oxford University Press Blog, Carbon Neutral: Oxford Word 
of the Year (13 November 2006), online: Oxford University Press <http://blog.oup.com/2006/11/ 
carbon_neutral_/>).  
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 The problem with a legislative solution is that it may not come to pass for an 
unacceptably long time. Since Canadian ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, 
the federal government has failed miserably to enact greenhouse gas legislation. As 
discussed above, federal politicians have demonstrated far more interest in tossing 
climate change around as a political football than in any genuine effort to address the 
climate change problem. 
 The simpler solution would be, then, to define by regulation SAEEs for federal 
projects that involve greenhouse gases. By regulatory fiat, Environment Canada could 
decree that any federal project that is not, say, carbon neutral, has an SAEE, and 
hence must not be approved or must be “justified in the circumstances” in order to 
proceed.188 The usual objection to such an administrative approach—that it can be 
easily undone—seems less persuasive in light of the pressing need to address 
greenhouse gas emissions sooner rather than later.  
 Although the CEA Act is a logical place to start in terms of engaging the federal 
government in the regulation of greenhouse gases, it is important to recognize the 
limitations of this approach. The CEA Act can only address new projects and does 
nothing to bring existing sources of greenhouse gas emissions under control. With 
Canada needing a 25 per cent reduction from current emissions to meet its Kyoto 
targets, holding firm on the status quo is insufficient. Adapting the CEA Act to include 
project review of the greenhouse gas implications is an important part, but only one 
part, of a Canadian response to the climate change problem. 
B. Cap-and-Trade vs. Intensity-Based Emissions Trading 
 The cap-and-trade idea is one of the major administrative reforms in the last three 
decades, taking most pollution decisions out of the domain of government policy and 
placing them into the hands of emitters. The most notable and successful cap-and-
trade program to date has been the U.S. sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions trading 
plan,189 under which most of the fossil fuel-fired electricity generating plants in the 
United States were allocated a certain number of allowances and required to have an 
allowance for each ton190 of SO2 emitted. The allocation of permits is based on an 
historical baseline (a string of years in the 1980s) and is set at a total lower than that 
baseline so that some overall emissions reduction is achieved. In its initial phase, the 
 
188 CEA Act, supra note 9, ss. 20(1)(b), 37(1)(b). “Significance” is not defined in the CEA Act 
regulations or guidelines. While all of the provinces have environmental assessment procedures, only 
Nova Scotia defines the word significant (Lawrence Environmental, Significance in Environmental 
Assessment (2000)at 7, online: Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency <http://www.ceaa-acee. 
gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=25C6595F-1&offset=7&toc=show>). See Environmental Assessment 
Regulations, N.S. Reg. 26/95, s. 2(1)(l)(i). 
189 Clean Air Act, supra note 12, §§ 7651a-7651o (1990). 
190 We employ the word “ton” to indicate the U.S. short ton. 
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program imposed a somewhat hard nationwide cap of 8.90 tons of SO2 per year,191 
while in subsequent years more facilities have been included and the cap raised 
slightly.192 The U.S. SO2 cap-and-trade program reduced SO2 emissions nationwide 
from over twenty-one million tons in 1994 to under fifteen million in 2006.193 
 Partly as a result of the perceived success of the SO2 program, emissions trading 
has gained worldwide acceptance as a way to reduce global greenhouse gas 
emissions. The Kyoto Protocol explicitly endorses emissions trading, not only 
permitting individual countries to achieve their national targets by emissions trading, 
but also encouraging trading by and between countries.194 The European Union has 
committed itself, in addition to the commitment of its member states, to an emissions 
reduction of 8 per cent below its 1990 levels195 and has undertaken an EU-wide 
emissions trading program to achieve it.196  
 While cap-and-trade programs minimize industry-wide compliance costs, they 
still impose them. Some proposals have sought to soften the economic blow further 
by allocating allowances that are keyed to productivity. As explained in Part I.A, 
above, these intensity-based trading programs essentially divide the absolute amount 
of emissions by some denominator that has to do with the quantity or value of the 
product produced. Greenhouse gas emissions intensity from electricity generation, for 
example, would be measured in terms of tonnes of CO2 per kilowatt-hour produced, 
so that if more efficient combustion techniques were discovered, boosting the amount 
of electricity produced, then the amount of allowed CO2 emissions could be 
increased.  
 The problem with intensity-based programs is that there is no credible way of 
knowing what actual greenhouse gas emissions will ultimately be, or even that there 
will be any reduction at all. If, for a particular emitter, production efficiency 
improvements outpace the rate at which emissions intensity targets tighten, then that 
emitter will have a pool of surplus allowances available, which it can sell to other 
emitters, relieving them of the need to reduce emissions. A facility that doubles 
 
191 Clean Air Act, supra note 12, § 7651b(a)(1) (1990). Special legislative dispensations, however, 
have pushed the real cap upwards. See text accompanying note 202. 
192 Ibid., §§ 7651b-7651d (1990). 
193 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Latest Findings on National Air Quality: Status and 
Trends Through 2006 (North Carolina: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2008) at 23, online: 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency <http://www.epa.gov/air/airtrends/2007/report/trends_report_ 
full.pdf>. 
194 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, art. 6. 
195 Ibid. at Annex B. 
196 Congressional Research Service, Climate Change: The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) 
Enters Kyoto Compliance Phase by Larry Parker (11 February 2008), online: National Center for 
Science Education <http://www ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/07Dec/RL34150.pdf>; Carbon 
Trust, The EU Emission Trading Scheme, online: Carbon Trust <http://www.carbontrust.co.uk/ 
climatechange/policy/eu_ets htm>.  
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production and meets a 20 per cent greenhouse intensity reduction target can still emit 
60 per cent more than it had originally.197  
 Intensity-based programs are also economically inefficient for reasons having 
nothing to do with environmental effects. The award of emissions allowances on the 
basis of productive output amounts to a distortionary output subsidy.198 An output 
subsidy creates economic inefficiency by encouraging overproduction, directing 
resources that might be used for other valuable goods into production of the 
subsidized good. While every industry has an incentive to innovate to increase profit 
margins, an intensity-based program creates an added incentive in the form of an 
extra source of wealth from productive efficiencies: the award of extra allowances. 
Apart from the environmental effects of this distortion, it creates a disadvantage for 
other industries. 
 Given equal initial conditions, it is safe to say that intensity-based emissions 
trading is both economically and environmentally inferior to cap-and-trade programs. 
C. Carbon Taxation vs. Cap-and-Trade 
 A more serious policy debate involves a comparison between a carbon cap-and-
trade program and a carbon tax. From a policy perspective, cap-and-trade programs 
supposedly create some certainty about the quantity of emissions allowed, while 
taxation programs provide some certainty with respect to the price of emissions. 
Some environmentalists have therefore called for a cap-and-trade program, on the 
reasoning that it is important to control the quantity of greenhouse gas emissions 
rather than worry about the cost.199 However, this is a superficial reason to favour 
quantity controls over price controls; any quantity can be achieved by price 
 
197 If the intensity target is a 20 per cent reduction, then a facility producing 100 units of output that 
doubles its production but improves its efficiency by 20 per cent (emitting only 80 per cent of the 
emissions per unit of output) can still emit greenhouse gas emissions equal to 160 units (80 per cent of 
200). 
198 An output subsidy is a payment keyed to production, so that an extra incentive is provided to 
produce the subsidized good. This is distortionary because it draws resources into production of the 
subsidized good in excess of what market signals would otherwise call for. For example, subsidizing 
production of all kinds of agricultural commodities has provided inexpensive food for consumers, but 
it is likely that some agricultural land would have been put to better use. For a discussion of how the 
output-based allocation of emissions allowances amounts to an output subsidy, see Carolyn Fischer, 
“Rebating Environmental Policy Revenues: Output-Based Allocations and Tradable Performance 
Standards” (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 01-22, 2001), online: Resources for the Future 
<http://www rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-01-22.pdf>.  
199 See e.g. E&ETV, “Climate: Pew’s Claussen Compares Cap-and-Trade with Carbon Tax 
Approaches for Emissions Reduction (On Point, 07/16/2007)” (16 July 2007) (“quite honestly, I’d 
rather put my money on the market, which is what a cap and trade does, because there the market sets 
the price. The government doesn’t set the price”) [transcript on file with author]. 
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mechanisms simply by setting the tax at an appropriate level.200 There are, however, a 
number of important differences that separate the two types of programs. The 
majority of these differences should give federal and provincial governments cause to 
favour a carbon tax program.  
 First, implementation problems have plagued cap-and-trade programs. As noted 
above, while a carbon tax is levied upon any sales transaction with a paper trail, a 
cap-and-trade system requires some design. A cap-and-trade program requires a 
determination of the level of the cap, which entities are subject to the program, and 
above all, how the emissions allowances are to be initially allocated. All of these are 
fraught with political peril. Moreover, a cap-and-trade system can only apply to 
certain emitters—those that have the resources to monitor their emissions and can 
buy and sell emissions allowances,201 but that are small enough in number for 
regulatory agency to monitor their compliance.  
 How allowances would be allocated is a thorny implementation issue. The 
traditional and most familiar approach is to give allowances away for free, based on 
some historical baseline of emissions, as was done in the SO2 program. The baseline 
calculation for what became a complicated formula was to grant fossil fuel-fired 
power plants emissions allowances equal to roughly half of the plant’s average 
emissions over a five-year period from 1980 to 1984. But arriving at this rule required 
extensive negotiations and was a sobering exercise in rent-seeking. Paragraph 
404(a)(3) of the U.S. Clean Air Act provides that utilities in Indiana, Ohio, and 
Illinois would receive a special clump of two hundred thousand allowances for the 
years 1995–1999, to be split in proportion to their baseline emissions.202 One would 
be hard pressed to find a more naked example of raw political power.  
 One way around this initial allocation problem is to allocate allowances by 
auction, which does away with quarrels over historical baseline rules. Auctioning 
allowances also provides significant economic benefits in that the revenues could be 
recycled and used to reduce other taxes. The problem with auctioning allowances is 
one of political economy. To the extent that allowances are given away for free by 
law, lawmakers writing cap-and-trade legislation are essentially printing money for 
distribution to appreciative constituents; hence, the inevitable but inelegant marriage 
of rent-seekers and lawmakers. 
 
200 In 1974, economist Martin Weitzman showed in a seminal work that it is only the uncertainty 
and steepness of the marginal pollution abatement curve that make either a quantity-control scheme 
(such as a cap-and-trade program) more or less economically efficient than a price-control scheme 
(such as a Pigouvian taxation program): Martin L. Weitzman, “Prices vs. Quantities” (1974) 41 
Review of Economic Studies 477. 
201 Jack Mintz & Nancy Olewiler, A Simple Approach for Bettering the Environment and the 
Economy: Restructuring the Federal Fuel Excise Tax (University of Ottawa: Sustainable Property 
Initiative, 2008). 
202 Supra note 12, § 7651c(a)(3). 
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 By ignoring historical emissions entirely, a carbon tax avoids having to deal with 
the self-serving appeals in favour of one baseline rule or another. A carbon tax is not 
free of political peril, but is harder to finagle. By definition, a carbon tax would have 
to be applied to carbon-containing fuels meant for combustion. Any carve-out from a 
universal rule would be conspicuously peculiar. For example, trucking industries, 
which would be hard-hit by a carbon tax designed to reduce gasoline usage, could 
conceivably lobby for an exemption for diesel fuel, but how politically saleable 
would such a special dispensation be? Would commuters paying more for gasoline 
tolerate such a dispensation? And then why not provide an exemption for the shipping 
industry? The slippery slope problems inherent in granting exemptions would make it 
more difficult to grant any. By contrast, the ways in which cap-and-trade allowances 
have been distributed are not necessarily obvious or free of controversy. 
 Another implementation issue pertains to the question of whether and how to 
incorporate “offsets”, a way for emitters to generate additional allowances by 
undertaking projects that supposedly reduce emissions from some baseline or 
business-as-usual path. The Kyoto Protocol has been vulnerable to this form of rent-
seeking. The “clean development mechanism”, by which a developed country may 
finance a “low-carbon” project in a developing country and in so doing collect credits 
towards meeting its Kyoto targets,203 has led to illusory emissions reductions. Far 
from achieving any greenhouse gas reductions, the program has mostly been a 
boondoggle, subsidizing projects in developing countries that are only undertaken 
because of the Clean Development Mechanism program.204 The problem with offsets 
is that it is difficult for a certifying authority to ascertain whether the business-as-
usual path is a genuine one or an ingeniously concocted story. For example, a 
proposal to generate offsets by lengthening rotations may or may not produce 
emissions reductions, as tree rotations may be extended for any number of economic, 
regulatory, or ecological reasons. Granting credits under such circumstances is 
gratuitous and frustrates emissions reduction objectives.  
 Perhaps the more salient question is how politically acceptable a carbon tax 
would be. The political reality is that the very mention of the word “tax” in the same 
sentence as “carbon” evokes emotional reactions. One study found that people were 
more positively inclined towards a program requiring a “payment” than one that 
involved a “tax”, even if the programs were substantively identical.205 While the word 
 
203 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, art. 12. 
204 Michael Wara, “Is the Global Carbon Market Working?”, Commentary, (2007) 445 Nature 595; 
Christa Marshall, “Carbon Offsets: The Shopper’s Guide to Reducing Carbon Footprints” 
ClimateWire (11 September 2008) [on file with authors]. 
205 Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, “The Political Psychology of Redistribution” (USC 
CLEO Research Paper C05-4, 15 March 2005) at 18-19, online: Social Science Research Network 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=695305>.  
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“tax” is always loaded in North America generally,206 in Alberta the word stirs up 
deep-seated resentment stemming from the Lougheed-Trudeau clash in the 1980s.207  
 Moreover, the carbon tax meets with political resistance because it is thought to 
be regressive.208 Gasoline taxes, for example, impose higher transportation costs that 
take up a larger proportion of a poor driver’s paycheque than that of a rich driver, so 
the thinking goes, such that an increase would deprive poorer drivers of more basic 
goods than rich drivers.209  
 This line of thinking, however, seems to be based more on selective anecdote 
than on empirical analysis.210 Moreover, the question of whether a carbon tax is 
regressive or not is more complicated than is typically presented in public discussion. 
Is a carbon tax regressive if the lowest quintile of households is hurt more than the 
second-lowest quintile, but the second-lowest quintile is hurt less than the richest 
quintile? How many income classifications are needed for analysis? Is elasticity to be 
taken into account?211 Do we think about regressiveness in terms of a present 
snapshot in time or do we think about the lifetime income or consumption of 
 
206 Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, “Heuristics and Biases in Thinking about Tax” in 
David Merriman, ed., Proceedings of the Ninety-Sixth Annual Conference on Taxation, Chicago, 
Illinois, November 13-15, 2003 (Washington, D.C.: National Tax Association, 2004) 434.  
207 See e.g. Susan Blackman et al., “The Evolution of Federal/Provincial Relations in Natural 
Resources Management” (1994) 32 Alta. L. Rev. 511.  
208 Sarah E. West & Roberton C. Williams III, “Estimates from a Consumer Demand System: 
Implications for the Incidence of Environmental Taxes” (2004) 47 Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 535 at 535 (“Most studies suggest that environmental taxes tend to be at 
least mildly regressive, making such taxes less attractive options for policy”); Shi-Ling Hsu, “Carbon 
Tax Heuristics and Politics: The Case of the Gasoline Tax” (15 April 2008), online: Social Science 
Research Network <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121039>.  
209 James M. Poterba, “Is the Gasoline Tax Regressive?” (1991) 5 Tax Policy and the Economy 145 
at 145-46 (there is a “long-standing view that excise taxes such as the gasoline tax are regressive, 
imposing a heavier burden on low-income households than on their higher-income counterparts”).  
210 The New York Times ran a series of articles on the impact of high gasoline prices on various 
individuals throughout the country, highlighting the hardships imposed upon cabdrivers (“‘Compared 
to a year ago, I pay $15 more a day in gas,’ said Miguel Gonzalez, 67, of Queens. ‘I only take home 
$100 a day, so that’s my lunch and dinner right there’”), immigrants (“Lesly Richardson, 50, a Haitian 
immigrant from Brooklyn, nodded in agreement. ‘That’s $100 a week,’ he said. ‘That’s your grocery 
bill’”), and single mothers (“Cindy Wright spoke of the pain high gas prices cause the single mothers 
who make up many of the clients at the public health clinic in Torrington, where she is a nurse”): “As 
Gas Prices Go Up, Impact Trickles Down” The New York Times (30 April 2006) A24. 
211 Regressivity could be measured by different delineations of income, and using a large variety of 
different assumptions about how drivers respond. The most careful study of the projected incidence of 
a gas tax increase was done by Sarah E. West and Roberton C. Williams III. They estimated separate 
demand models for each of five income quintiles and found that under the most severe and simplistic 
assumptions—that gasoline is perfectly inelastic and that people make no adjustments whatsoever to 
changes in the price of gasoline—the incidence on the poorest quintiles is not substantially different 
from that of the next two higher quintiles (West & Williams, supra note 208 at 551, Table 3).  
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individuals?212 It is simplistic to flatly pronounce, as NDP leader Jack Layton has, that 
a carbon tax would hurt the poor.213 
 One way to blunt these critiques is to return or “recycle” carbon tax revenues in 
such a way as to reduce the economic pain of those having to pay the tax or to 
redistribute income to the poor.214 As economists generally consider income and sales 
taxes to be distortionary,215 proposals to reduce environmental harm by taxation have 
the potential bonus of reducing distortionary taxes and increasing social welfare.216 Or 
the revenues could even be recycled back to emitters forced to pay the tax, as Sweden 
has done with a tax on emissions of nitrogen oxides.217 These revenue recycling ideas 
often serve to dull the political sharp edges of taxation proposals. 
 An important consideration to bear in mind, however, is that the point of a carbon 
tax would be to decrease consumption of carbon-emitting activities such that tax 
proceeds would eventually decline. The carbon tax should not be oversold, then, as 
both an effective and economically painless way to reduce emissions. What carbon 
tax proceeds could provide is some temporary aid for the various transitional costs 
associated with making the kinds of structural societal changes required to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
212 Kevin A. Hassett, Aparna Mathur & Gilbert E. Metcalf, “The Incidence of a U.S. Carbon Tax: A 
Lifetime and Regional Analysis” (2007) National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 
13554 [on file with author]. 
213 Joanna Smith, “Carbon Tax Would Hurt Poor, NDP Says” Toronto Star (23 May 2008), online: 
Toronto Star <http://www.thestar.com/News/Canada/article/429174>.  
214 It should be noted that if emissions allowances are auctioned, cap-and-trade programs can also 
raise revenues.  
215 See e.g. Lawrence H. Goulder et al., “The Cost-Effectiveness of Alternative Instruments for 
Environmental Protection in a Second-Best Setting” (1999) 72 Journal of Public Economics 329; Ian 
Parry, Roberton C. Williams III & Lawrence H. Goulder, “When Can Carbon Abatement Policies 
Increase Welfare? The Fundamental Role of Distorted Factor Markets” (1999) 37 Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 52; Ian Parry & Wallace E. Oates, “Policy Analysis in 
the Presence of Distorting Taxes” (2000) 19 Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 603. 
216 This economic effect, popularly known as the “double dividend”, is the subject of debate. It has 
been argued that environmental taxes increase the cost of goods, such that reducing distortionary 
income taxes may not offset the excess burden of the environmental tax. See Lawrence H. Goulder, 
“Effects of Carbon Taxes in an Economy with Prior Tax Distortions: An Intertemporal General 
Equilibrium Analysis” (1995) 29 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 271. 
However, it has also been argued that this fails to account for the fact that the income tax system, by 
allowing deductions, creates distortions by favoring certain kinds of spending. Thus, if environmental 
taxes can reduce income taxes, it can also reduce these distortions: Ian W.H. Parry & Antonio M. 
Bento, “Tax Deductions, Environmental Policy, and the ‘Double Dividend’ Hypothesis” (2000) 39 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 67. 
217 The nitrogen oxide tax in Sweden is levied upon energy producers but rebated to them in 
proportion to energy output (International Institute for Sustainable Development, The Nitrogen Oxide 
Charge on Energy Production in Sweden, online: IISD <http://www.iisd.org/greenbud/nitro htm>). 
This would, however, convert the tax into a distortionary output subsidy (Fischer, supra note 198). 
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 The more direct response to these political and psychological objections is for 
policymakers to emphasize the hidden costs and administrative headaches of poorly 
designed cap-and-trade programs. It is worth repeating that a cap-and-trade program 
and a carbon tax should work exactly the same way in economic theory, but the cap-
and-trade program entails some more difficult design issues, such as determining who 
is covered by the program. Cap-and-trade programs may appear to be less expensive 
because costs are somehow hidden from view. For carbon taxes, recycled revenues 
can be directed towards transitional relief to temporarily assist with capital 
expenditures that help with adjustment into a lower carbon-emitting economy. The 
most honest and effective aspect of a carbon tax is that it will induce the kind of 
widespread changes to consumption patterns that are needed to reduce emissions.  
 In environmental instrument choice, pollution taxation has played the role of 
“bad cop” to cap-and-trade’s “good cop” because taxation always appears to be more 
costly than cap-and-trade programs. The obvious but obscured reality is, however, 
that environmental progress will always have costs—the question is who bears the 
costs, not whether they are borne at all. Among economists, there is a growing 
consensus that a carbon tax is a superior means of addressing greenhouse gas 
emissions.218 The economic virtue and political downfall of taxation programs is that 
they generally present the costs in an open and transparent fashion, while cap-and-
trade programs, if implemented by issuing free, “grandfathered” allowances, hide 
them.  
 A carbon tax is clearly the most economically and environmentally effective 
option to address climate change. The implementation advantages of administering 
what is essentially another sales tax over the regulatory infrastructure that would be 
needed to design and administer a cap-and-trade program are compelling. While 
political shenanigans have saddled cap-and-trade programs with special allocation 
perks that frustrate emissions reduction objectives, a federal carbon tax would be 
more difficult to sabotage. Because a federal carbon tax would typically be levied on 
a transaction like a sales tax, it would require a bit more audacity to write some 
blatant giveaway into legislation to insulate or exempt certain industries or 
individuals. Taxes are by their nature more universal: they come with a presumption 
that everyone pays them. Moreover, even if federal and provincial cap-and-trade 
 
218 Economists Favor Fossil Fuels Tax to Spur Alternatives—Survey, E&E News PM, Feb. 8, 2007. 
Nobel Laureate Economist Joseph Stiglitz, a former chief economic advisor to President Bill Clinton, 
called for a global carbon tax in 2006 (Joseph E. Stiglitz,  “A New Agenda for Global Warming”, 
online: (2006) 3:7 Economists’ Voice 3 <http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 
1210&context=ev>). Harvard Economics Professor N. Gregory Mankiw, a former economic advisor 
to President George W. Bush, did as well (N. Gregory Mankiw, “Raise the Gas Tax” The Wall Street 
Journal (20 October 2006), online: Wall Street Journal <http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB116131055641498552 html>).  
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programs were to coexist, the practical complexities of such a situation could 
undermine the effectiveness of either or perhaps both programs.219 
D. Command-and-Control Regulation 
 Because greenhouse gases are a by-product of such a wide variety of activities, a 
regulation of the command-and-control type would likely be complex, might take one 
of many different forms, and might draw on a wide variety of technologies. For coal 
combustion, industry standards might refer to carbon capture and storage technology 
or coal gasification,220 or any number of technologies and processes that have come 
along in the drive to save coal combustion from obsolescence in a carbon-constrained 
world. For natural gas exploration, command-and-control regulation might mandate 
techniques to limit flaring, the wasteful initial burning off of natural gas before the 
gas stream can be harnessed. For other combustion and industrial processes, a variety 
of other technologies and techniques may be possible. Command-and-control 
regulation in the context of greenhouse gas regulation would thus be a mandate to 
install some emissions-reduction technology or adopt some emissions-reducing 
practices, most likely ones that are ascertained by looking at industry practices or 
perhaps common industry ideas. It would be impossible to cover all Canadian 
greenhouse gas emitters, as there are thousands of smaller emitters that are too 
numerous to identify and regulate.  
 That said, a small number of credible voices have called for command-and-
control type regulation of greenhouse gases simply because immediate and dramatic 
governmental action is required. From a policy perspective, there may be 
considerable advantage in a blunt but broad instrument, one that might achieve some 
deep reductions very soon even if it comes at a high compliance cost. While 
economics might theoretically favour cap-and-trade or carbon taxation programs, the 
practicalities and politics of such programs may cause a delay that humankind may 
not be able to afford. The advantage of the traditional command-and-control type of 
regulation is that administrative agencies in developed countries such as Canada 
already know how to carry it out. With the kind of market signals that politicians have 
recently talked about implementing—a modest forty dollars per tonne in the case of 
the 2008 Liberal Party proposal for a federal carbon tax—large-scale structural and 
 
219 Bankes & Lucas, supra note 73. 
220 Carbon capture and storage typically involve separating CO2 from other gases in the emissions 
process, compressing it to a high density, and then storing it underground or beneath the ocean to 
isolate it from the atmosphere (International Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Special Report: Carbon 
Dioxide Capture and Storage, Technical Summary by Edward Rubin et al., online: IPCC 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/srccs/srccs_technicalsummary.pdf>).  
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cultural changes may not take place in time.221 While a price on carbon is a necessary 
condition to greenhouse gas reduction, it may not be a sufficient one.222 
 Prominent economists such as Jeffrey Sachs, the director of the Earth Institute at 
Columbia University, have thus argued for large-scale governmental intervention into 
the many technological possibilities that could make a major and near-term difference 
in reducing greenhouse gases. For example, carbon capture and storage technology, 
which would capture CO2 at its point of emission and pipe and store it underground 
without allowing its escape into the atmosphere,223 would require a substantial 
amount of government-sponsored research, the construction of pipelines that cross 
property boundaries and jurisdictions, and the monitoring of storage facilities to 
ensure the CO2 actually stays underground.224 Development and maturation of this 
technology is not possible without substantial governmental involvement. It has also 
been argued that climate technologies need such widespread and rapid deployment 
that uniformity of technology is required to coordinate their worldwide adoption.225 In 
light of the difficulty of inducing developing countries to undertake emissions 
reductions, agreement upon a single way of doing things may facilitate a fairly large-
scale change in relatively short order.  
 All of the considerations that favour a command-and-control response are global 
in nature and only implicate Canada as one of many developed countries that could 
lead by example. Like the United States, however, Canada has some uniquely 
favourable conditions for undertaking large, government-supported projects that 
could produce global command-and-control strategies: a huge (too huge) 
infrastructure for the mining, transport, and combustion of coal; a vast (yet not vast 
enough) network of pipelines that could be utilized for CO2 transport; and oil and gas 
exploration ventures that might benefit from a means of “enhanced recovery” using 
CO2 as a gaseous pump to extract more oil or gas.226 One pilot project involves the 
piping of CO2 captured from a plant in North Dakota to an oil field in Saskatchewan 
to increase production from the oil field.227 While private efforts such as these are 
encouraging, the widespread and rapid adoption of these efforts will require 
 
221 Jeffrey D. Sachs, “Technological Keys to Climate Protection” Scientific American (18 March 
2008), online: Scientific American <http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=keys-to-climate-protection>; 
James Cowan, “Green Shift’s Final Reach Still Unknown” National Post (4 July 2008), online: 
National Post <http://www nationalpost.com/Story-printer html?id=633029>.  
222 Sachs, ibid. 
223 International Panel on Climate Change, supra note 220. 
224 Sachs, supra note 221. 
225 See Scott Barrett, Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) at 261-62, 395. 
226 International Panel on Climate Change, supra note 220 at 19, 21, 23, 36-37. 
227 IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme, CO2 Capture and Storage, Weyburn Enhanced Oil 
Recovery Project, online: CO2 Capture and Storage <http://www.co2captureandstorage.info/project_ 
specific.php?project_id=70>.  
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considerable governmental involvement that might usefully take the form of 
command-and-control regulation.  
Conclusion 
 Both constitutional and policy considerations favour two instruments for 
reducing Canadian greenhouse gases: a carbon tax and the CEA Act. As we have 
argued, it is clear that both the federal and provincial governments have the authority 
to impose a carbon tax, and the federal authority to consider greenhouse gases under 
the CEA Act is also quite solid. In addition, both the carbon tax and the environmental 
assessment process enjoy the constitutional and political advantage of leaving 
provincial initiatives alone. Under taxation schemes, the federal and provincial 
governments are free to establish and pursue their greenhouse gas objectives without 
interference from one another.  
 In contrast, a comprehensive federal cap-and-trade system might survive 
constitutional scrutiny but would raise issues about its relationship with provincial 
trading programs. Command-and-control regulation, thought to be less economically 
efficient than cap-and-trade programs or carbon taxes, may nevertheless play a role in 
greenhouse gas regulation since it would stand a better chance of surviving 
constitutional scrutiny than would a cap-and-trade program. The Alberta government 
and the federal government have both shown increased interest in carbon capture and 
storage, but this strategy gives rise to enormous potential for conflict over who will 
be required to capture carbon, who will store it, and where. That two levels of 
government should independently pursue separate programs requiring such a great 
deal of coordination is folly. Finally, the greenhouse gas intensity-based system that 
the federal government is currently pursuing poses both constitutional and policy 
problems.  
 The policy advantages of a carbon tax and of the CEA Act are quite strong. Both 
draw on existing regulatory infrastructures. In the case of the carbon tax, little 
additional monitoring and enforcement capability is required, as taxation at a 
transaction point is something that revenue agencies throughout Canada already do 
quite effectively. And while the existing CEA Act currently does a poor job of 
addressing greenhouse gas considerations, relatively simple amendments by 
regulation or legislation would suffice to patch its shortcomings. By contrast, there 
are some fairly serious policy issues that would need to be dealt with before either a 
federal cap-and-trade or command-and-control system could be put in place, and 
more still with intensity-based emissions trading. 
 The politics of greenhouse gas regulation are changing rapidly, more quickly than 
federal politicians realize. The familiar old economic doomsayers have lost 
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credibility. With even oil sands interests coming out in favour of a carbon tax,228 it 
appears that Canadians are more willing to absorb economic pain than federal 
politicians, in their pocketbook pandering, have expected. Sometimes the simplest of 
solutions are the most elusive to grasp. Yet Canadians and the world would benefit 
greatly if federal politicians could summon up the modest courage and foresight 
needed to implement a sensible greenhouse gas reduction strategy by taking advantage 
of the two most promising policy instruments: a carbon tax and the CEA Act. 
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